

S262032

Case No. _____

**In the Supreme Court
of the
State of California**

GREGORY GEISER,
Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent,

v.

PETER KUHNS, et al.
Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants.

AFTER A DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE, CASE No. B279738
SUPERIOR COURT OF COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
CASE NOS. BS161018, BS161019 & BS161020
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ARMEN TAMZARIAN

Petition for Review

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Issue Presented for Review

Is organizing and attending a community demonstration “conduct . . . in connection with . . . an issue of public interest,” Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subd. (e)(4), where the undisputed evidence established that (a) the demonstration took place on a public sidewalk protest, (b) between 25 and 30 people attended the demonstration, (c) several sizable media outlets reported on the dispute before and after the demonstration, and (d) the plaintiff’s own company issued a press release about the dispute?

Why Review Should Be Granted

The Court of Appeal here withheld protection of the anti-SLAPP statute from a housing rights organizer who was sued by a wealthy developer after the organizer planned and attended a demonstration against the developer’s business practices. In so holding, the court’s opinion threatens those who participate in public protests and warps the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections beyond recognition.

The facts here are largely undisputed. When Pablo and Mercedes Caamal lost the house they shared with their three children to foreclosure during the financial crisis, they turned to the Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment Action (ACCE)—one of the state’s largest housing rights organizations—for help. ACCE’s Los Angeles director Peter Kuhns organized the community to help the Caamals repurchase the property from

Wedgewood, the corporate buyer. News coverage documented the ongoing struggle.

After Wedgewood evicted the family, Kuhns, the Caamals, and a group of supporters held a public sidewalk demonstration outside Wedgewood CEO Greg Geiser's home. About 25 to 30 people attended. They sang songs, chanted, and gave speeches. It lasted an hour. Police observed the protest and gave no instructions or warnings to the demonstrators.

Geiser sued Kuhns for his decision to organize and participate in the public sidewalk demonstration. He sued the Caamals, too. And when settlement talks broke down because Geiser insisted that Kuhns and ACCE agree to never criticize his company again, Wedgewood issued a press release detailing the dispute and criticizing ACCE for not agreeing to the non-disparagement clause.

This Court first granted review in this case in 2018. (*Geiser v. Kuhns*, review granted Nov. 14, 2018, S251756.) After this Court transferred the case back to the Second District with instructions to reconsider its result in light of *FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc.* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (*FilmOn*), a divided panel found the sidewalk protest attended by dozens of people was an issue purely personal to the Caamals and not an issue of public interest for the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute. In finding that the dispute was purely personal to the Caamals, the majority failed to explain the presence of Kuhns—the organizer who Geiser also sued—or the dozens of other protesters with no stake in, or connection to, the foreclosure of the Caamals' home.

The dissent would have found that this case was a paradigmatic SLAPP suit, as evidenced by multiple demonstrators, the involvement of a housing rights organization, and press attention to the dispute. The dissent lamented that “[t]he upshot of the majority’s anti-SLAPP holding is that in a small corner of Southern California, the venerable American tradition of peaceful public protest—often the only resort of those with modest means—is left diminished by a well-funded litigation scheme seeking to suppress it.” (Dis. Opn. at p. 12.)

This case presents the opportunity for this Court to set the opposing boundary to the one it set in *FilmOn*. *FilmOn* revealed when speech does *not* further the conversation on an issue of public interest: a commercial speaker privately communicating to its subscribers. But some courts—both before and since *FilmOn*, including the majority here—have swung radically in the other direction, interpreting the public interest requirement so narrowly that it would deny protection to even the paradigmatic SLAPP suit. As *FilmOn* provided guidance to courts on deciding when speech does not further the conversation on a public issue, courts now need guidance on when speech *does* further such conversations.

Review of this case (for a second time) is necessary to ensure the majority’s misapplication of *FilmOn* does not become the law in California.

Statement of the Case

I. **After a Family Loses Their Home to Foreclosure, a Community Organizes to Help Them Repurchase It from the Corporate Buyer**

Mercedes and Pablo Caamal lived in their Rialto home with their three children for about a decade before they lost it to foreclosure in the wake of the financial crisis. (1 JA 96–98.)

An affiliate of Wedgwood, the nation’s largest fix-and-flip company, bought the home and moved to evict the family. (2 JA 326–328; 1 JA 96.)

When they regained employment, the family reached out to Wedgwood in an effort to keep their home, but the company ignored them. (1 JA 96.) The family sought assistance from the ACCE, an advocacy organization dedicated to saving homes from foreclosures and fighting against displacement of long-term residents. (1 JA 111.)

With an eviction pending, Mercedes and Pablo Caamal— together with ACCE’s Los Angeles director Peter Kuhns and other supporters—went to Wedgwood’s office building and asked to see Wedgwood’s CEO Gregory Geiser. (1 JA 96, 108, 111.) He was not there. (2 JA 321.)

Another Wedgwood executive met with the family, agreed to halt the eviction, and the demonstrators dispersed. (1 JA 96.) Police responded but no one was cited or arrested. (1 JA 111.)

The media took note. *La Opinión*—the second largest newspaper in Los Angeles—ran a story about the Caamals’ desperate attempt to remain in their home. (See *Familia logra*

parar el desalojo y tiene oportunidad de recuperar su hogar, La Opinión (Dec. 17, 2014) <<https://bit.ly/2YyMZ6z>> [as of May 6, 2020], cited at 1 JA 75, 129, 183.) The headline read, “Family Manages to Stop Eviction and Has Opportunity to Regain Home,” and the article weaved the family’s story into the larger narrative of the thousands of families who lost their homes to companies unwilling to negotiate. (*Ibid.*)

When Mrs. Caamal obtained financing and sought to negotiate with Wedgewood, it ignored her again. (1 JA 97, 105–106.)

The family—along with Kuhns and others—returned to Wedgewood’s office, seeking a response to their entreaties. (1 JA 98, 111.) The same executive again agreed to meet with the family and review their loan documents if the supporters dispersed. (1 JA 111, 165, 219.) They did. (*Ibid.*) Police responded but again no one was cited or arrested. (*Ibid.*)

La Opinión ran another piece about the dispute. (See Martínez Ortega, *‘De aquí no me sacan más que arrestado’ advierte dueño de casa al borde del desalojo*, La Opinión (Mar. 24, 2016) <<https://bit.ly/3c6weDJ>> [as of May 6, 2020], cited at 3 JA 731.) That article described how the public had mobilized support for the family by camping out in the front yard to stave off the eviction and again wove the family’s story into the broader narrative: families suffering personal and national hardship losing their homes to predatory house-purchasing corporations. (*Ibid.*)



A still from the second La Opinión article.

The online news source Huffington Post also ran an article about the family’s fight. (See Dreier, *A Working Class Family Battles a ‘Fix and Flip’ Real Estate Tycoon*, Huffington Post (Mar. 28, 2016) <<https://bit.ly/2xyZt2Q>> [as of May 6, 2020], cited at 1 JA 75, 129, 183.) It too situated the family’s fight within the broader context of the housing market meltdown, noting the family’s condition “is an experience that millions of Americans have faced.” (*Ibid.*) It detailed “an around-the-clock vigil to demand that the eviction be stopped,” attended by several community members. (*Ibid.*)



Facing eviction by Wedgewood Inc, Pablo Caamal and his family have launched a vigil in front of their Rialto, CA home, supported by friends and neighbors (Photo by *La Opinion*).

A still from the Huffington Post article.

II. After the Family Is Evicted, Housing Rights Activists Hold a Public Protest Outside CEO Geiser’s Residence

On March 30, 2016, Sheriff’s Deputies locked the family out of their home. (1 JA 98.)

Together with the Caamals, Kuhns and ACCE organized an emergency public demonstration for that evening outside Geiser’s Manhattan Beach home. (1 JA 98, 108, 112.) Between 25 and 30 people attended. (1 JA 114.) The local chapter of the National Lawyers Guild dispatched an attorney to act as a legal observer. (*Ibid.*)

The demonstrators held signs, sang songs, chanted, and gave short speeches, all from the public sidewalk. (1 JA 98, 108, 112.) Within a few minutes of the start of the demonstration, several police officers arrived, who allowed the demonstration to

continue without warning or instruction. (1 JA 98, 108, 112, 114.)
It lasted a little over an hour. (1 JA 98, 108, 112, 114.)

III. Geiser Sues the Family and the Housing Rights Organizer as Media Interest Grows

Two days after the eviction and demonstration, Geiser filed petitions for civil harassment restraining orders against Kuhns and the Caamals on the basis of their public demonstration outside Geiser's home. 1 JA 22–63.

The lawsuit fueled the media's interest in the story. Various regional newspapers and online outlets ran stories. (See Cambron, *American dream denied: Homeowners preyed upon by multi-billion dollar company*, People's World (Apr. 4, 2016) <<https://bit.ly/2YyzFPu>> [as of May 6, 2020]; *Everyone Asks, Why Does It Take So Long?*, The Housing Bubble (Apr. 5, 2016) <<https://bit.ly/2W3gsnf>> [as of May 6, 2020]; Victoria, *Rialto family fights eviction; says realtor's actions unjust*, Rialto Record Weekly (May 12, 2016) <<https://bit.ly/2YAKssE>> [as of May 6, 2020] (Victoria), each cited at 3 JA 617, 630; Burns, *Manhattan Beach moves to ban picketing outside homes*, Daily Breeze (July 20, 2016) <<https://bit.ly/2SyFXdZ>> [as of May 6, 2020]; McDonald, *Manhattan Beach council modifies upcoming election, rejects picketing law*, Easy Reader (July 21, 2016) <<https://bit.ly/3c6sIZQ>> [as of May 6, 2020]; Barnes, *Rialto family's eviction prompting protests in Manhattan Beach*, San Bernardino County Sun (July 24, 2016) <<https://bit.ly/2Wtn1Pe>> [as of May 6, 2020]; Segura, *Manhattan Beach backs away from*

proposed restrictions on picketing, Daily Breeze (Aug. 18, 2016) <<https://bit.ly/2W2vXvO>> [as of May 6, 2020], each cited at 3 JA 732.)

And Breitbart News ran a story about the foreclosure, demonstration, and lawsuit. (Barajas, *ACORN Reborn: Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment*, Breitbart News (May 21, 2016) <<https://bit.ly/3b5n1tK>> [as of May 6, 2020], cited at 3 JA 732.) The byline failed to mention that the author—who had never written an article for the outlet before and has not since—is a Wedgewood public-relations spokesperson. (See Victoria, *supra*, quoting Breitbart News article’s author Hector Barajas on dispute with the Caamals and describing him as a “Wedgewood spokesperson.”)

IV. After Kuhns and the Caamals File Anti-SLAPP Motions, Geiser Dismisses His Suits and Issues a Press Release

Kuhns and the Caamals filed anti-SLAPP motions. (1 JA 64–225.) The parties tried to settle the lawsuits but negotiations broke down after Geiser insisted on a nondisparagement clause that sought to insulate Wedgewood from any future criticism by ACCE. (3 JA 672–682.)

After walking away from the settlement, Geiser dismissed each of his lawsuits while the anti-SLAPP motions were still pending. (3 JA 711–718.)

Before serving the requests for dismissal, Wedgewood *issued a press release* detailing its version of the settlement

negotiations and their eventual demise. (5 JA 1348; Moody, *Media Statement In Response to ACCE*, Wedgewood, Inc. (Aug. 16, 2017) <<https://bit.ly/2SFbwTs>> [as of May 6, 2020].) The press release admitted Wedgewood refused to settle because ACCE would not agree to abstain from criticizing Wedgewood in the future. (5 JA 1348.) It decried ACCE’s “portray[al of] the Caamal family as victims, while exploiting a very emotional issue without any serious attempt . . . to resolve the situation.” (*Ibid.*) And it acknowledged the public’s interest, further editorializing that for ACCE, “making headlines and political gain[] far outweighs helping the Caamals return to their home.” (*Ibid.*)

V. After Kuhns and the Caamals’ Anti-SLAPP Motions Are Denied for Lack of a Public Interest, This Court Directs the Court of Appeals to Reconsider

Kuhns and the Caamals moved for an award of attorney fees under both the anti-SLAPP statute and the civil harassment statute. (3 JA 719–721.)

The trial court denied the motions in part under the anti-SLAPP, finding the statute did not apply because there was no public issue or issue of public interest, despite months’ worth of press coverage and public protests showing otherwise. (6 JA 1689–1692.) The court granted the motion in limited part under the discretionary fee-shifting provision of the civil harassment statute. (6 JA 1692–1695.)

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order finding Kuhns’ and the Caamals’ protest was not done in connection with

an issue of public interest. Acting Presiding Justice Lamar Baker dissented and predicted the panel would have to reconsider its decision given this Court’s then-pending review on the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute’s public interest prong.

This Court granted review and held briefing pending the decision in *FilmOn*. After this Court issued its opinion, it transferred this case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to reconsider its decision in light of *FilmOn*.

VI. The Court of Appeal Majority Again Finds a Lack of Public Interest

On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals again split 2–1. In what the dissent characterized as a “largely recycled opinion,” Dis. Opn. at p. 1, the majority again found that Kuhns’ and the Caamals’ protest was not connected to an issue of public interest.

In applying the first part of the *FilmOn* analysis—determining “what public issue or . . . issue of public interest the speech in question implicates,” *FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149¹—the majority defined the issue narrowly. It determined that the public protest outside Geiser’s residence attended by more than two dozen people was “focused on coercing Wedgewood into selling back the property to Ms. Caamal at a reduced price,” and as such “was a private matter concerning a former home owner

¹ Internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations have been omitted here and throughout this Petition, unless otherwise noted.

and the corporation that purchased her former home and not a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Opn. at p. 18.)

The majority grounded this narrow framing of the issue by focusing on Kuhns’ and the Caamals’ earlier visits to Wedgewood’s office and virtually ignoring the sizable protest on a public sidewalk outside Geiser’s home. (Opn. at pp. 19–20.) Similarly, the majority found that “a third-party participant[’s]” declaration that the protest was organized “to protest unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood . . . and its agents in acquiring the real property of Pablo and Mercedes Caamal, and evicting them from their home” was a motivation “purely personal to the Caamals and did not address any societal issues of residential displacement, gentrification, or the root causes of the great recession.” (*Id.* at pp. 20–21.) And the majority found that while there was evidence that 25 to 30 people attended the protest outside Geiser’s home and held signs, sang songs, and gave speeches, there was no evidence of the *specific text* on the signs, or the *specific words* in the speeches or songs, linking their rudimentary protest to more sophisticated, abstract issues of gentrification and displacement. (*Id.* at p. 21.)

The majority dismissed out of hand the media coverage of the dispute between the Caamals and Wedgewood, quoting a Legislatively overturned case to conclude that “[w]hile the fact of media coverage may be indicative of a public matter, [m]edia coverage cannot by itself . . . create an issue of public interest within the statutory meaning.” (Opn. at p. 24, quoting *Zhao v. Wong* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1121 (*Zhao*).)

Having determined on the first step of the *FilmOn* analysis that the issue was purely personal, the majority had little need for the contextual analysis required by the second step. (Opn. at pp. 25–27.)

The majority’s opinion concluded by conceding that Kuhns’ and the Caamals’ activity “does bear certain hallmarks of classic SLAPP conduct,” including holding signs, singing songs, and giving short speeches. (Opn. at p. 26.) But the majority dismissed those hallmarks by asserting that “merely characterizing conduct as a demonstration or picket does not grant that conduct First Amendment protections.” (*Ibid.*)

VII. The Dissenting Opinion Would Have Found a Public Interest

Acting Presiding Justice Baker dissented again.

The dissent began by noting that early in *FilmOn*, this Court recognized that “[i]n the paradigmatic SLAPP suit, a well-funded developer limits free expression by imposing litigation costs on citizens who protest, write letters, and distribute flyers in opposition to a local project.” (Dis. Opn. at p. 2, quoting *FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 143.) This case, the dissent noted, has 1) a well-funded developer; 2) citizens protesting a local project; and 3) limits on free expression by imposing litigation costs. (Dis. Opn. at p. 2.)

After summarizing the facts and holding of *FilmOn*, the dissent provided a detailed application of the *FilmOn* framework to this case. On the first step of the *FilmOn* analysis, the dissent

identified the issue as “displacement of long-term community residents by unfair foreclosure and fix-and-flip housing practices.” (Dis. Opn. at p. 6.) The dissent pointed to various evidence in the record to support finding that the issue was broader than a purely personal dispute between the Caamals and Geiser: ACCE’s mission of fighting residential displacement and their involvement in the demonstration, the legal observer’s statement that the demonstrators sought “to protest unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood,” and the participation of 25 to 30 people at a Wednesday night demonstration. (*Id.* at p. 7.)

Addressing the majority’s criticism that declarants did not specifically identify the text of the signs or the words of the songs and speeches, the dissent noted the criticism “is logical so far as it goes: the absence of direct protestor quotes in the declaration means the majority is free to believe ACCE members and others present outside Geiser’s home might have been holding signs and chanting about the Protestant Reformation or some topic other than displacement of long-term residents like the Caamals.” (Dis. Opn. at p. 7, fn. 8.) But such a reading, the dissent recognized, “is a strained and artificial way to read the record.” (*Ibid.*)

And the dissent noted that the public clearly showed interest in the issue and the demonstration, noting that Wedgewood’s own press release accusing ACCE of “making headlines” should have put to bed any doubt about the public’s interest. (Dis. Opn. at p. 8.)

Applying the second step of the *FilmOn* analysis, the dissent found “[t]he identity of the defendants, the audience they

sought, and the timing and location of the speech all show a degree of closeness between the protest and the ongoing public conversation about housing displacement.” (Dis. Opn. at p. 10.) The speakers included not only Kuhns and the Caamals, but “other ACCE members[,] . . . and ACCE’s identity and involvement is strong evidence of a connection to an issue of public interest.” (*Ibid.*) The audience—unlike the audience in *FilmOn*—“was the general public.” (*Ibid.*) The “location and timing” also “evinced a contribution to the public debate”: a sidewalk protest on the same evening as the Caamals’ eviction. (*Id.* at p. 11.)

The dissent dissected the majority’s contrary conclusion that the protest was directed solely at seeking to force Wedgewood to resell the property to the Caamals. “At the most obvious level, the sidewalk protest—which involved ACCE members who volunteered to help the Caamals—cannot be fairly said to have been directed *solely* at Wedgewood and Geiser with no connection to broader issues of interest to the community.” (Dis. Opn. at p. 11.) But even if that were their sole purpose, the protestors’ means of achieving that end was “by appeal[ing] to public sentiment.” (*Id.* at p. 12.) “In other words, even if helping the Caamals were the only objective, the way in which defendants and the other protesters hoped to achieve it was by connecting the Caamals’ individual plight to public interest in, and disapproval of, long-time community resident displacement and unfair foreclosure practices.” (*Ibid.*) The dissent would have

found each contextual factor demonstrated a connection to a public issue. (*Id.* at p. 12.)

Neither party petitioned for rehearing in the Court of Appeal.

Argument

I. Summary of Argument

The California Legislature has commanded, and this Court has repeatedly reaffirmed, that the anti-SLAPP statute must be “construed broadly” to further its goal of encouraging “continued participation in matters of public significance.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (a).) But some appellate courts restricted the scope of the law’s protection through cramped, extra-statutory limitations on interpreting what constitutes a matter of “public interest” under the statute. And some, including the majority here, have persisted in that narrow approach in the wake of *FilmOn*.

The majority erred in framing the issue as narrowly as it could. By framing the issue as a purely personal dispute between the Caamals and Wedgewood, the majority dispensed with the contextual analysis required by *FilmOn*. And it did so by ignoring Kuhns’ and the Caamals’ own framing of the issue.

The majority opinion also conflicts with every reported decision applying the anti-SLAPP to public protest. Until this decision, the Courts of Appeal had unanimously applied the anti-SLAPP statute to public demonstrations. (See, e.g., *Thomas v.*

Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635 (*Thomas*); *Lam v. Ngo* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832; *Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228 (*Huntingdon Life Scis.*); *City of L.A. v. Animal Def. League* (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 606 (*Animal Def. League*); *Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1138 (*Fashion 21*).

The opinion below undermines *FilmOn*, departs from the broad construction mandate, applies an impermissibly cramped reading of the statute, and raises the specter of normative determinations about what the public should or should not be interested in determining the scope of the law’s protection. It threatens speakers, demonstrators, and the media, in contradiction of the legislative intent.

II. By Defining the Issue as Narrowly as Possible, the Majority Made the *FilmOn* Analysis Superfluous

After the Courts of Appeal struggled for decades to define what constitutes “a public issue or an issue of public interest” for the purpose of section 425.15, subsection (e)(4), this Court in *FilmOn* provided a framework for making that determination.

FilmOn mandates “a two-part analysis rooted in the statute’s purpose and internal logic” to determine whether speech is made in connection with an issue of public interest. (*FilmOn*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.) “First, [a court should] ask what public issue or issue of public interest the speech in question

implicates—a question [courts can] answer by looking to the content of the speech.” (*Ibid.*)

“Second, [a court should] ask what functional relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation about some matter of public interest.” (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.) Here, “context proves useful.” (*Id.* at p. 150.) “[C]ontext allows [courts] to assess the functional relationship between a statement and the issue of public interest on which it touches.” (*Id.* at p. 140.) *FilmOn* directed lower courts to use “ordinary contextual clues” to determine whether speech connects to an issue of public interest, including “the identity of the actor,” “the audience of the speech,” and “the purpose of the speech.” (*Id.* at p. 145.)

FilmOn expressed disapproval with those decisions that “strive to discern what the challenged speech is really ‘about’ — a narrow, largely private dispute, for example, or the asserted issue of public interest.” (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149, citing *Bikkina v. Mahadevan* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 70, 85 (*Bikkina*); *World Financial Group, Inc. v. HBW Ins. & Financial Services, Inc.* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1561, 1572 (*World Financial Group*); *Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.* (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 111 (*Mann*)).) That approach “is less than satisfying,” this Court noted, because “speech is rarely ‘about’ any single issue.” (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.)

A. The Majority Flouted *FilmOn*'s Approach to Determining an Issue of Public Interest Under the Anti-SLAPP Statute

Ignoring the guidance this Court provided in *FilmOn* and the weight of other authority interpreting the “public interest” requirement, the majority found that a community demonstration on a public sidewalk attended by 25 to 30 people against a major real estate developer did not involve an issue of public interest. It reached that conclusion by framing the issue as narrowly as possible: “a private matter concerning a former homeowner and the corporation that purchased her former home.” (Opn. at p. 19.) If this were the proper framing, no David-and-Goliath situation—the paradigm anti-SLAPP scenario—would be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.

The majority embraced the strict analysis this Court rejected in *FilmOn*. While it acknowledged *FilmOn*, it refused to apply the framework it mandates, instead determining that this case was ‘really about’ a purely personal dispute between the Caamals and Geiser’s company. (Opn. at pp. 18–20.) In doing so, it ignored *FilmOn*’s command to avoid hunting for a singular, transcendental issue.

The majority found that this was a purely personal dispute because Geiser was neither “a public figure [n]or had gained widespread notoriety throughout the community for his real estate activities,” and because “the Caamals’ private dispute with plaintiff was [not] one of many similar disputes shared in common with members of the community.” (Opn. at p. 23.) In so

doing, the majority appeared to be concerned with two of the three “categories of public interested matters,” Opn. at 4, originally delineated in *Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913 (*Rivero*): 1) a person or entity in the public eye; 2) conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants; and 3) a topic of widespread, public interest. (Opn. at p. 4, citing *Rivero, supra*, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 924.)

The majority also seemed to apply—but ultimately dodged—the third *Rivero* category by recognizing the media attention the Caamals’ dispute received. (Opn. at p. 24.) But the majority waved away that attention, declaring that “[m]edia coverage cannot by itself . . . create an issue of public interest within the statutory meaning,” (*Ibid.*, quoting *Zhao, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121.²) In short, a sizeable public protest did not show public interest and neither did the media attention.

While *FilmOn* cited *Rivero* a case that correctly “distilled the characteristics” of an issue of public interest, it explicitly held

² Even if the Court of Appeal’s approach was proper, reliance on *Zhao* would have still been error. It was *Zhao*’s restricted interpretation of the public interest prong that prompted the Legislature to take the rare step of intervening and specifically overturning it. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1296 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 1997, at p. 4; see also Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1296 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 12, 1997, at pp. 1, 4 [singling out *Zhao* as *the* case the Legislature intended to overturn by amendment].) *Zhao* is not only bad law but stands as a clear demonstration of how the statute is *not* to be interpreted.

Rivero's three categories were "nonexclusive." (*FilmOn*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.) And *FilmOn* confirmed that a court's task is to determine whether the speech "implicates" a public issue—not whether it slots into the *Rivero* categories—because "speech is rarely 'about' one thing." (*Id.* at p. 149.)

In fact, in each of the cases *FilmOn* criticized as "less than satisfying" for seeking out a singular issue, the court relied heavily on the *Rivero* categories to reach its decision. (*Ibid.*; *Bikkina*, *supra*, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 83–85; *World Financial Group*, *supra*, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1570–1571; *Mann*, *supra*, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 111.)

Other courts have also expressed fealty to the *Rivero* categories in the wake of *FilmOn*. One Second District decision venerated *Rivero* as "the historic taproot of the guiding doctrine," enshrined "*Rivero*'s status as especially authoritative," and applied the *Rivero* categories as though they were exclusive in finding a dispute between feuding neighbors was not an issue of public interest. (*Jeppson v. Ley* (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 845, 851, 856.)

Similarly, in *Serova v. Sony Music Entm't* (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 103, 118–119—another case this Court transferred for reconsideration in light of *FilmOn*—the Second District discussed the *Rivero* categories as an authoritative guide to determining a public issue. That case involved whether Michael Jackson sang on particular recordings marketed as his, and, applying the first *Rivero* category, found an issue of public interest because "Michael Jackson was a famous entertainer who

was very much ‘in the public eye.’”³ (*Id.* at p. 119, quoting *Rivero, supra*, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 924.)

And in *Ghiassi v. Bagheri* (July 17, 2019) No. H042939, 2019 WL 3213854, *10, the Sixth District, applying the *Rivero* categories, found public interest lacking because there was an insufficient showing the parties “are in the public eye, that the conduct directly affected a large number of people, or that it involved a topic of widespread public interest.”

Even if the ultimate results in those cases were correct, the means of reaching them undermines *FilmOn* and sets dangerous precedent for future disputes. In each of those cases, as in this case, the courts insisted on “discern[ing] what the challenged speech is really ‘about’” rather than determine what public issues the speech at issue “implicates” and then applying *FilmOn*’s context-and-context framework. (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.) Courts that continue to search for a singular issue that a case is “really about”—whether grounded in the *Rivero* categories or not—define speech not by its speaker or content, but by a court’s normative assessment of its relevance or agenda, contrary to this Court’s explicit guidance in *FilmOn*.

Courts that frame an issue overly narrow or restrict public issues to preset categories threaten to strip the anti-SLAPP statute’s protection from average citizens participating in the issues that shape their lives. The implication that there was no public issue because Geiser was not “a public figure or had gained

³ This Court granted review of that decision. (*Serova v. Sony Music Entm’t*, review granted Apr. 22, 2020, S260736).

widespread notoriety throughout the community for his real estate activities,” Opn. at p. 23, is that the Caamals needed only be evicted by a celebrity developer to receive the protection of the statute. This result would make the law unrecognizable to the legislators who enacted the anti-SLAPP statute.

If cases like this one do not receive the statute’s protection merely because they involve average people’s experiences with large-scale issues, then virtually every SLAPP would similarly fail to gain the statute’s protection. Even in the paradigmatic case of protesting citizens sued by the well-funded developer, few developers are household names and few projects generate “widespread” public interest.

With a narrow enough lens, virtually any dispute can be framed as a ‘purely personal’ one. As Justice Baker asked Geiser’s counsel during oral argument: couldn’t one also claim that Rosa Parks had a purely personal dispute with her municipal transit operator?

The express legislative intent shows that legislators intended the statute to protect people involved in individual disputes that affected their lives and whose voices were silenced by SLAPP suits. The author of the bill that created the anti-SLAPP statute cited “[e]xamples of SLAPP suits” which the statute was “intended to screen.” (Sen. Com. On Judiciary Rep. on Sen. Bill 1264 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 25, 1992, at p. 4.) The examples included lawsuits that targeted speech critical of a “local sanitary district’s garbage burning plant,” another trash incinerator in a different community, and a local land

development project. (*Ibid.*) These lawsuits did not arise from abstract speech about environmental pollution or land development in some generalized way, but the claims arose from speech about specific, local manifestations that *implicated* these broader public issues.

By searching for a singular issue that a case is “really about,” judges risk unintentionally making normative, substantive judgments about the speech at issue by mistaking their own interests with the public interest. Judges routinely find public interest in issues that middle-class professionals could easily imagine themselves facing or caring about: alerting a potential home buyer that a sex offender lives nearby, parents criticizing a youth basketball coach’s coaching style, plastic surgery, or allegations of molestation by a particular church official or youth sports coach. (*Cross v. Cooper* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 378 [current home tenants’ disclosure to prospective home purchaser that a sex offender lived nearby was speech undertaken in connection with an issue of public interest]; *Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 455–456 [fourth grade basketball coach’s suit arising from parent coaching complaints implicates an issue of public interest]; *Gilbert v. Sykes* (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 23–24 [public interest in plastic surgery]; *Terry v. Davis Community Church* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1547 [public interest in allegation of molestation against church youth pastor]; *M. G. v. Time Warner, Inc.* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 623, 628–629 [public interest in molestation in youth sports].) But

without a proper framework to guide their decisionmaking, judges risk missing the connection to issues of public interest in situations outside the lived experience of most professionals: a near-homeless family protesting foreclosure and eviction, for instance, or janitors organizing for better working conditions. (*Rivero, supra*, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 924 [no public interest in eight janitors’ criticism of their supervisor and working conditions].)

The majority’s analysis undermines the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute, conflicts with its plain language, and threatens to strip the statute of its intended protection. Without direction from this Court on how to determine what constitutes an issue of public interest, speakers and demonstrators risk uncertainty and results-driven outcomes instead of the broad protection the statute mandates. The lower courts require additional guidance from this Court to avoid the dangers of an “I know it when I see it” approach. Review is needed to provide a consistent approach for all courts to apply and to guard against such interpretations undermining this Court’s decision in *FilmOn*.

**B. The Court Should Grant Review to Make Clear
That the Defendant’s Identification of the Issue
Is Entitled to Deference**

This problem of courts searching for the singular issue that a case is “really about” has a simple solution: courts need only defer to the defendant’s framing of the issue. This Court should

grant review to make explicit that a defendant's identification of the issue is entitled to deference.

This solution is already implicit in this Court's anti-SLAPP precedent. *FilmOn* accepted the issues of public interest as the defendant identified them: "the presence of adult content on the Internet, generally, and the presence of copyright-infringing content on FilmOn's websites, specifically." (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.) Applying the contextual analysis, though, it found DoubleVerify's speech did not further any conversation on those issues. (*Id.* at p. 153.)

As with *Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871. This Court accepted the "three issues of public significance" as identified by the defendant, *id.* at p. 900, but found that CNN's speech did not further the public debate on those issues. (*Id.* at pp. 901–904.)

Each of the cases criticized by *FilmOn* for "striv[ing] to discern what the challenged speech is really 'about,'" *FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149, gave no deference to the defendant's framing of the issues and instead adopted the plaintiff's narrow framing. (*Bikkina, supra*, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 85; *World Financial Group, supra*, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1572; *Mann, supra*, 120 Cal.App.4th at 111.)

So too here. The majority muddled *FilmOn*'s instruction to look to an "issue of public interest the speech in question *implicates*," by rejecting Kuhns' and the Caamals' identification of the issue and adopting Geiser's framing. (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149, italics added.) Instead, the court should have

determined whether Kuhns’ and the Caamals’ protest implicated issues of residential displacement and then, on the second step of the *FilmOn* analysis, determined whether their conduct furthered public discussion about that issue. But the majority simply declared *the* issue was the “purely personal” dispute between the Caamals and Geiser’s company, end of story. (Opn. at p. 21.)

Once a court decides a defendant’s speech was “really about” something other than what the defendant claims it is about, the conclusion is forgone. *FilmOn*’s contextual analysis becomes superfluous. The relevant contextual clues in the second part of the *FilmOn* analysis will virtually never line up with an issue the defendant does not even claim to address. Instead, as in *FilmOn* and *Wilson*, courts should defer to the defendant’s framing of issue and apply the contextual analysis to determine whether the speech furthered public discussion on that issue.

Such deference would have little downside. As the dissent here noted, “[t]here is little concern speakers will devise and rely on post-hoc rationalizations because the analysis of context—the degree of closeness between the identified interest and the pertinent circumstances—that occurs at step two of the *FilmOn* inquiry will normally smoke out a fabricated issue of public interest identified at step one.” (Dis. Opn. at pp. 6–7, fn. 3.) That kind of smoking out is exactly what happened in *FilmOn* and *Wilson*. (*FilmOn*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 153; *Wilson*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 901–904.)

The Court should grant review to clarify that the *FilmOn* framework requires at least some deference to the defendant’s identification of the public issue.

C. Properly Applied, *FilmOn* Reveals a Connection to a Public Issue

Review is also warranted here because, despite this Court’s instruction to reconsider its decision, the majority did not apply *FilmOn*’s contextual analysis in any meaningful way.

It provided *no* analysis of “the identity of the speaker,” *FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 140, 142, 147, but focused instead on the identity of the *plaintiff*. (Opn. at p. 23. [grounding its finding of lack of public issue in determination that Geiser was not “a public figure” and “had [not] gained widespread notoriety throughout the community for his real estate activities”].) *FilmOn* establishes it is not the identity of the plaintiff that provides the context to the defendant’s speech, but the speaker’s—here, a housing rights organization and other participants in a public protest. As the dissent recognized, “Kuhns and other ACCE members participated in the sidewalk protest outside Geiser’s home, and ACCE’s identity and involvement is strong evidence of a connection to an issue of public interest.” (Dis. Opn. at p. 10.)

As to the audience of the speech, *FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 143, the majority dismissed two dozen people protesting on a public sidewalk by claiming the residential location and lack of “evidence of a media presence” at the protest made Geiser the

sole audience.⁴ (Opn. at p. 27.) A faithful application of *FilmOn* would have shown that, unlike that case in which the audience was “a coterie of paying clients,” *FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 153, the audience here was the public at large. (See Dis. Opn. at p. 10 [distinguishing the confidential commercial speech in *FilmOn* and finding that “[r]ather the audience for the speech at issue was the general public, i.e., those within earshot of the protest and those that might hear about it later, including via press reports”].)

To be sure, Geiser was part of the protesters’ audience, but they also sought to inform the public, including his neighbors and others in his community, of his behavior. Courts regularly recognize that demonstrations geographically-focused on an individual still seek to speak to the public. (*Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe* (1971) 402 U.S. 415, 419 [demonstrators’ leafletting in target’s residential neighborhood was fully protected speech because it sought to “openly and vigorously . . . mak[e] the public aware of [Keefe’s] real estate practices”]; *Huntingdon Life Scis., supra*, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1241, 1246 [protest outside home of animal testing facility employee “contribute[d] to the public debate”]; *Animal Def. League, supra*, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 620–621 [same for employee of animal shelter].)

⁴ It is unclear why a media presence at *this* demonstration might have shown a connection to an issue of public interest given the majority’s wholesale dismissal of the media’s presence at and coverage of the Caamals’ earlier protests against Wedgewood. (Opn. at p. 24.)

Other contextual clues, like the location and timing of the speech, also show a connection to a public issue—a public sidewalk protest that “occurred the very same day of the Caamals’ eviction—when public interest in their plight as a concrete example of the consequences of housing displacement was likely to be at its apex.” (Dis. Opn. at p. 11.)

The majority’s analysis of “the purpose of the speech,” *FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 143, just reflexively circled back to its determination of what it found the case was “really about”—“coercing Wedgewood into selling back the property to Ms. Caamal at a reduced price.”⁵ (Opn. at p. 26.) The majority explained away one declarants’ statement that one of the purposes of the demonstration was “to protest unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood . . . and its *agents in acquiring the real property of Pablo and Mercedes Caamal, and evicting them from their home*” by just italicizing the latter half of the statement. (Opn. at 21.) As the dissent recognized, though, “[a]pplication of italics, however, is not legal analysis. Emphasizing the latter half of [the declarant’s] sentence does not somehow wipe away [the declarant’s] assertion that unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood were in play.” (Dis. Opn. at p. 9.)

⁵ The majority’s conclusion that the ‘purpose’ prong of the contextual analysis was identical to how it defined the issue in the first place underlines the need to defer to the defendant’s framing of the issue at the outset. Otherwise, like the majority found here, the ‘purpose’ prong of the contextual analysis would be redundant.

Perhaps if the Caamals were alone in their demonstration outside Geiser's home, or if Geiser sued only the Caamals, the majority's conclusion that the protest was 'purely personal' to the Caamals might be plausible. But they weren't, and he didn't, so it isn't. Dozens of people with no connection to the Caamals' property joined the protest—including Kuhns, a local organizer for one of the state's largest housing rights organizations, who Geiser then sued. Geiser didn't sue Kuhns because Kuhns had any connection to the "purely private" eviction between the Caamals and Geiser's company. Geiser sued Kuhns to shut him up. And Geiser's company *admitted as much in its press release*, explaining Wedgewood blew up the parties' settlement negotiations because ACCE refused to agree to withhold all future criticism of the company. (5 JA 1348.)

Unlike cases in which defendants "merely offer a 'synecdoche theory' of public interest, defining their narrow dispute by its slight reference to the broader public issue," *FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 152, Kuhns' and the Caamals' protest tied directly to the broader dispute. ACCE's involvement, as an organization on the front line of broader disputes around foreclosure and residential displacement, shows as much. And multiple news outlets independently reported on the issue, reflecting informed professional judgments about what the public is interested in, and tying the specific issue facing the Caamals to the broader public issues related to the foreclosure crisis. The media coverage of this dispute demonstrates that the connection to the public interest was clear and substantial.

The purpose of Kuhns’ and the Caamals’ speech was to shame a business leader who they viewed as engaging in callous and unethical business practices—as with thousands of other public demonstrations.

The majority erred in failing to follow *FilmOn*. Its decision should be reversed.

III. The Court Should Grant Review Because the Majority Opinion Conflicts with All Other Decisions Applying the Anti-SLAPP Statute to Public Protests

Before the majority’s decision here, California courts had unanimously applied the anti-SLAPP statute to claims arising from public protests. (See Burke, *Anti-SLAPP Litigation (The Rutter Group 2016) Application — Public Protests*, § 3:123, p. 3-66.) Neither Geiser nor the majority cites a single case in which the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to a demonstration in a public forum. The majority appears to be the only court to have ever denied the law’s application to demonstrators.

In fact, the majority’s decision directly conflicts with another demonstration case with notably similar facts. In *Thomas, supra*, the First District found the anti-SLAPP statute applied to a civil harassment petition filed by a landlord against a tenant who, helped by a community renters’ organization, organized a sidewalk protest against the landlord. (*Thomas, supra*, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 653–655.) That court found it particularly significant that the tenant “did not act alone, but in conjunction with planned demonstrations against [the landlord]

by a nonprofit group purportedly dedicated to upholding tenant rights. Thus, [the court concluded,] while [the tenant’s] private interests were certainly in issue, there were much broader community interests at stake in the protests.” (*Id.* at p. 661.)

Thomas is on all fours with this case. But the majority attempts to distinguish *Thomas* on a minor factual difference, arguing there was evidence the landlord there was accused of wrongdoing by more than 100 tenants, while the Caamals showed Wedgewood was sued only two other times for unlawful business practices. (Opn. at pp. 21–23.) The majority declined to define the threshold number of tenants a landlord must swindle before the public’s interest in his business practices is valid for the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute.

Other cases addressing the anti-SLAPP law’s application are in accord. In *Huntingdon Life Sciences*, a protest outside the home of an animal testing facility employee attended by 15 to 20 participants met the public issue requirement because animal testing generally is an issue of public interest and the demonstrators’ activity “contribute[d] to the public debate.” (*Huntingdon Life Scis.*, *supra*, 129 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1241, 1246; see also *Animal Def. League*, *supra*, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 620–621 [demonstration outside home of city animal shelter employee involved a public issue because “[d]emonstrations . . . to criticize government policy regarding the alleged mistreatment of animals at City-run animal shelters . . . constitute a classic exercise of the constitutional rights of petition and free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest”].)

In *Fashion 21*, a lawsuit arising from a demonstration against a clothing manufacturer that had a workplace dispute with 19 garment workers was found to arise from the defendants' exercise of free speech in connection with a public issue. (*Fashion 21, supra*, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144.)

And in *Lam*, the anti-SLAPP statute protected Vietnamese-American anti-communists who protested a local politician who did not speak out against a video store that hung a North Vietnamese flag in its window. (*Lam, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 837.) The Court of Appeal found there was "no doubt" the protests attended by a few dozen people "concern[ed] an issue of public significance in his constituency." (*Id.* at 845.)

As with each of these cases, so too here. Between 25 and 30 people attended an emergency weeknight protest on a few hours' notice. The protest certainly implicated the family's interests, but the family's interests themselves created a public interest, as shown by the media attention to their struggle to keep their home. And it implicated broader issues, too, as shown by ACCE's participation, the attendance of the legal observer from the National Lawyers Guild, and dozens of participants with no demonstrable relationship with the family.

The majority opinion injects confusion into this established precedent on the anti-SLAPP statute's application to participation in a public protest. Review is needed to resolve this split in authority.

IV. The Court Should Grant Review Because the Majority Opinion Threatens Anti-SLAPP Protections for the Media

A variety of media covered the Caamals' David-and-Goliath story as the controversy unfolded. Two major media outlets—La Opinión and Huffington Post—covered the Caamals' fight with Wedgewood to keep their house prior to their eviction and the protest outside Geiser's house. (See *supra*, Statement of Case, sec. I.) Many more outlets later covered the dispute. (See *supra*, Statement of Case, sec. III.)

By framing the issue as a purely personal dispute between the Caamals and Geiser's company, the majority threatens to strip protections from the media that report on these types of issues. Nearly by definition, issues that receive repeated media coverage are issues in which the public is interested in. These were not self-published statements based on the speakers' own judgment of the importance of their cause. (See *Weinberg v. Feisel* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128–1129.) Rather, multiple news outlets reflected informed professional judgment about what the public is interested in and tied the specific issue facing the Caamals to the broader public issues of the foreclosure crisis.

But had Geiser targeted his litigation at La Opinión or the Huffington Post instead of the protestors, the issue would have been the same. And the media, like Kuhns and the Caamals here, would have been left unprotected.

Even the contextual clues from the second part of the *FilmOn* analysis that might help protect a newspaper more than

a demonstrator—including the identity of the speaker and the audience of the speech—would offer no refuge because the issue itself is defined as a purely personal dispute. Again, the contextual clues in the second part of the *FilmOn* analysis become superfluous if a court frames the issue so narrowly in the first part.

This Court should grant review because the majority’s opinion threatens media that covers human interest stories that implicate issues of broad public interest.

Conclusion

The great majority of appeals involving anti-SLAPP challenges to lawsuits are far afield from the core, paradigmatic lawsuits that the statute was originally designed to guard against. “But this wolf comes as a wolf.” (*Morrison v. Olsen* (1988) 487 U.S. 654, 699 (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.)) Rare is the case that is so clearly aimed at punishing public participation and so directly within the primary purpose for which the anti-SLAPP statute was passed.

For all the reasons discussed above, Kuhns and the Caamals respectfully request that the Court grant review and reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of May, 2020

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Kuhns, Mercedes Caamal, and
Pablo Caamal

Certificate of Word Count

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.204(c), the text of this brief, including footnotes and excluding the caption page, table of contents, table of authorities, the signature blocks, and this Certificate, consists of 8,377 words in 13-point Century Schoolbook type as counted by the Microsoft Word word-processing program used to generate the text.

Dated this 6th day of May, 2020.

Law Office of Matthew Strugar
Law Office of Colleen Flynn

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Kuhns, Mercedes Caamal, and
Pablo Caamal

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

COURT OF APPEAL – SECOND DIST.

DIVISION FIVE

FILED

Feb 28, 2020

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GREGORY GEISER,

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Plaintiff, Appellant, and
Cross-Respondent,

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. BS161018,
BS161019, BS161020)

v.

PETER KUHNS et al.,

Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Armen Tamzarian, Judge. Affirmed.

Dinsmore & Sandelmann, Frank Sandelmann and Brett A. Stroud, for Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent.

Law Office of Matthew Strugar, Matthew Strugar; Law Office of Colleen Flynn, Colleen Flynn, for Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Gregory Geiser filed petitions for civil harassment restraining orders against defendants Peter Kuhns and spouses Mercedes and Pablo Caamal, after defendants demonstrated at plaintiff's place of business and in front of his residence in an attempt to prevent the Caamals' eviction from their home. In response, defendants moved to strike the civil harassment petitions as strategic lawsuits against public participation (anti-SLAPP motions). After plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his civil harassment petitions, the trial court awarded defendants attorney fees as the prevailing parties on the petitions. The trial court denied defendants' attorney fees on their anti-SLAPP motions, ruling they would not have prevailed on the motions.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court's determination that defendants were the prevailing parties on the civil harassment petitions and, alternatively, the calculation of the attorney fees award. Defendants appeal the trial court's determination that they would not have prevailed on their anti-SLAPP motions.

On August 30, 2018, we affirmed the trial court's orders. On November 14, 2018, the California Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for review. On September 11, 2019, the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to us with directions to reconsider the matter in light of its decision in *FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc.* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (*FilmOn.com*) which interpreted the "catchall provision" of the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(4)¹). Having considered *FilmOn.com's* application to this matter, we affirm.

¹ All statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise stated.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the founder, President, and Chief Executive Officer of Wedgewood LLP, which is in the business of purchasing, rehabilitating, and selling distressed properties. On September 23, 2015, through a non-judicial foreclosure sale, a Wedgewood subsidiary purchased from Wells Fargo a triplex Ms. Caamal owned (the property) for \$284,000. Wedgewood then obtained an eviction judgment for one of the units.

According to Ms. Caamal, on December 17, 2015, she and her husband, along with a group of concerned citizens, went to Wedgewood's office building and requested a meeting with plaintiff to attempt to prevent their eviction and to negotiate a repurchase of her home. The concerned citizens included Kuhns and persons involved with the Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE), an entity whose various missions include saving homes from foreclosure and fighting against displacement of long-term residents. Kuhns is the Los Angeles Director for ACCE. The group set up a tent in Wedgewood's lobby and disrupted its business.

Plaintiff was not present. Wedgewood's Chief Operating Officer Darin Puhl and its General Counsel Alan Dettelbach went to the lobby. Dettelbach attempted to move the tent and was shoved by one of the demonstrators. The police were called. No one was arrested or cited.

Puhl spoke with the Caamals and learned they were interested in repurchasing the property. He offered to meet with them in private if the demonstrators left the building. The Caamals agreed. In the meeting, the Caamals told Puhl they could afford to repurchase the property. Puhl agreed to hold off enforcement of Wedgewood's eviction judgment on the property's

first unit (an unlawful detainer trial was set for January 2016 for the other two units) for several weeks so the Caamals could meet with a lender to assess whether they could qualify for a loan. Although Puhl “gave [the Caamals] an idea of the value [of the property] according to similar properties in the area,” they did not discuss a purchase price.

The Caamals subsequently submitted to Wedgewood a prequalification letter apparently with a purchase price of \$300,000. In early January 2016, Puhl again met with the Caamals. Puhl informed them that Wedgewood believed the property was worth \$400,000 according to real estate websites and \$300,000 was unacceptable. Wedgewood offered to sell them the property for \$375,000.

The Caamals asked for additional time to obtain a home loan, agreeing to vacate the entire property within 60 days—by March 20, 2016—if they could not obtain financing. On March 18, 2016, the Caamals sent Wedgewood a prequalification letter with a \$300,000 purchase price. Wedgewood deemed the prequalification letter unacceptable because it was not for the purchase price of \$375,000 and it expressly stated that it did “not constitute loan approval.”

The Caamals did not vacate the property by the date agreed upon, and, on March 23, 2016, they, Kuhns, and persons involved with ACCE returned to Wedgewood’s office building seeking to meet with plaintiff. Mr. Caamal allegedly stated, “[Y]ou’re not getting me out of this property alive.” The Caamals and their supporters left the premises either because the police were called and removed them or because Puhl agreed to review the Caamals’ “prequalification” documents.

Because the Caamals had not arranged to purchase the property by the date agreed upon, Wedgewood had the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department evict them on March 30, 2016. Later that night, defendants and persons involved with ACCE went to plaintiff's residence. According to defendants, the Caamals and their supporters staged a residential picket on the sidewalk outside of plaintiff's home. They held signs, sang songs, chanted, and gave short speeches. The demonstration lasted for about an hour—from about 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. Officers from the Manhattan Beach Police Department were present, but did not order the demonstrators to disburse or intervene to stop the demonstration. No one was arrested or cited.

According to Gilbert Saucedo, a National Lawyers Guild legal observer, ACCE organized the demonstration to protest the unfair and deceptive practices Wedgewood and its agents used to purchase the property and to evict the Caamals. He estimated there were 25 to 30 demonstrators and described the demonstration as "peaceful."

Plaintiff viewed the demonstration at his home differently. Two days after the demonstration, he filed petitions for civil harassment restraining orders against defendants. In his petitions, plaintiff stated that around 9:00 p.m., a "mob" of about 30 persons arrived at his residence and chanted, "Greg Geiser, come outside! Greg Geiser, you can't hide!" Plaintiff called the police. His wife sneaked out the back door and hid at a neighbor's house.

Plaintiff further recounted the incident in his declaration in support of restraining orders as follows: "Sometime before midnight, as a result of discussions with the police and Wedgewood's lawyer, the mob disbanded. My wife and I were left

shaken by the escalating campaign of harassment that has followed me from work to my home. In view of the mob actions combined with the direct verbal threats, we are in fear for our safety. We have arranged for private security to stand guard outside both our place of business and our house.

“I further understand from conversations Wedgewood’s general counsel had with the police the night the mob assaulted my home that police require a court order to keep the mob away from my house by any meaningful distance. This is why we are seeking this Court’s assistance in issuing an order for these respondents to stay away from my wife and me, my business, and my home, by at least 100 yards.”

The trial court issued temporary restraining orders. The orders required defendants to stay at least 50 yards from plaintiff, his wife, and Wedgewood for the following three weeks.

Defendants responded to the civil harassment petitions by filing anti-SLAPP motions. They claimed plaintiff was attempting to stifle their free speech and expressive activity.

In addition to the civil harassment petitions, plaintiff sought to prevent further demonstrations in front of his home through the Manhattan Beach City Council. The day after the demonstration, plaintiff spoke with a city council member. Based on that conversation, the council member proposed an ordinance to the Manhattan Beach City Council that would prohibit targeted residential picketing.

On July 5, 2016, plaintiff spoke at the Manhattan Beach City Council meeting at which the proposed ordinance was

addressed.² During a break in the meeting, Manhattan Beach Police Department Chief Eve Irvine approached plaintiff and assured him that what had happened at his home on March 30 would never be allowed to happen again. She explained the police department had received additional training about how to enforce the city's existing laws in those types of situations. If the demonstrators returned to his home, the police department would do everything in its power to make sure that his home, family, and neighbors were protected. Following that meeting, plaintiff had several phone conversations with other members of the Manhattan Beach Police Department and members of the Manhattan Beach City Council during which he was assured that if a similar demonstration happened, he could expect a "full response" from the police department.

On August 4, 2016, plaintiff dismissed without prejudice the three civil harassment petitions.³ He dismissed the petitions because, based on his July 5, 2016, conversation with Chief Irvine, he "felt reassured" the police department would respond appropriately if the demonstrators returned. Also, it had become clear to plaintiff from ongoing settlement negotiations with the Caamals that they were not going to repurchase the property and

² On August 17, 2017, the City Council tabled a motion to approve the ordinance.

³ Plaintiff and Wedgewood had also filed a civil action against defendants and ACCE relating to essentially the same conduct giving rise to the civil harassment petitions (case number BC615987). We grant plaintiff's request to take judicial notice of plaintiff's dismissal of that action on July 14, 2016, and otherwise deny his request for judicial notice.

he believed it would be easier to list and sell the property without pending litigation.

When plaintiff dismissed the civil harassment petitions, the trial court had not ruled on defendants' anti-SLAPP motions. Defendants moved for an award of \$84,150 in attorney fees (a \$56,100 lodestar with a 1.5 multiplier) and \$370 in court costs as the prevailing parties under the mandatory attorney fees provision of the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1)) and, alternatively, as the prevailing parties under the discretionary attorney fees provision of the civil harassment statute (§ 527.6, subd. (s)) (attorney fees motion).⁴ The trial court ruled that defendants would not have prevailed on the anti-SLAPP motions, but found they were the prevailing parties on the civil harassment petitions. The trial court thus awarded defendants \$40,000 in attorney fees and court costs. In declining to award the full amount sought by defendants, the trial court found that the hourly rates defendants' attorneys requested were high in light of their experience and the nature and difficulty of the litigation. The trial court also found that large parts of the requested attorney fees related to unsuccessful settlement negotiations and the anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court concluded would not have succeeded.

⁴ Defendants did not separately request attorney fees for work performed on the anti-SLAPP motion and for work performed on the civil harassment petition. Instead, they sought an award of attorney fees for all work performed in the litigation.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Appeal

Plaintiff appeals the award of attorney fees and costs, claiming the trial court erred by: (1) excluding evidence that was crucial to determine that plaintiff was the prevailing party on the civil harassment petitions; (2) ultimately concluding that defendants were prevailing parties; and (3) miscalculating the amount of fees.

A. “Exclusion” of Evidence

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it excluded as hearsay his declaration testimony that Chief Irvine assured him the police department would protect him and his family in the event of further demonstrations at his home. The ruling was error, plaintiff argues, because the testimony was offered to show that plaintiff acted in reliance on that assurance when he dismissed his civil harassment petitions, and not for the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that the police would protect him. Plaintiff contends the error was prejudicial because it was crucial to the trial court's prevailing party determination. The trial court did not err.

We review a trial court's rulings on evidentiary objections for an abuse of discretion. (*Carnes v. Superior Court* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 688, 694.) “Discretion is abused only when in its exercise, the trial court ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.’” (*Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz* (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 281 (*Shaw*)). An appellant bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion when challenging a trial court's discretionary rulings. (*Ibid.*)

In the declaration he submitted in opposition to defendants' attorney fees motion, plaintiff stated that Chief Irvine, other members of the Manhattan Beach Police Department, and members of the Manhattan Beach City Council assured him the police department would protect him if the demonstrators returned to his home. Defendants objected to those parts of plaintiff's declaration as hearsay.

The trial court ruled, "[Plaintiff] claims he obtained the relief he sought *outside of court* after he received an assurance from Manhattan Beach Police Chief Eve Irvine that 'what happened at [his] home on the night of March 30 would never be allowed to happen again.' This statement and similar alleged statements by Chief Irvine and other city officials, however, are inadmissible hearsay." In a footnote appended to the ruling, the trial court stated, "[Plaintiff] argues that the statements are admissible to show what his state of mind was when he dismissed the petitions. The court agrees. (See Evid. Code, § 1250.) But petitioner's state of mind is of marginal relevance to the issue of who was the prevailing party in this litigation and the other issues the court must decide to adjudicate [defendants'] motions."

Later, in a section addressing defendants' evidentiary objections, the trial court sustained hearsay objections to the statements made by other members of the Manhattan Beach Police Department and by Manhattan Beach City Council members. With respect to the statements attributed to Chief Irvine, the trial court sustained the hearsay objection, explaining that "Chief Irvine's statements are hearsay to the extent they are offered for the truth of the matter asserted."

Plaintiff's appeal concerns only the trial court's ruling on Chief Irvine's alleged statements. His argument that the trial

court erred by excluding the statements as hearsay fails because the trial court did not exclude the statements for all purposes. The trial court’s ruling is clear. It excluded the police chief’s statements to the extent they were offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but admitted them to explain why plaintiff dismissed his civil harassment petitions—the very reason plaintiff argues on appeal they were admissible. Accordingly, we find no error with respect to the trial court’s evidentiary ruling.

B. *Prevailing Party*

Plaintiff contends the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that he was not the prevailing party under section 527.6. He argues that he prevailed because he “obtained the object of the litigation, namely assurances from representatives of the City of Manhattan Beach that future harassment would be prevented.” We disagree.

We review a trial court’s prevailing party ruling under section 527.6 for an abuse of discretion. (*Adler v. Vaicius* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777; *Elster v. Friedman* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1443 (*Elster*)). As stated above, a trial court abuses its discretion “only when in its exercise, the trial court ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.’” (*Shaw, supra*, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)

“A plaintiff will be considered a prevailing party when the lawsuit “was a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the primary relief sought” or succeeded in “activating defendants to modify their behavior.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (*Elster, supra*, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1443–1444 [section 527.6 action].) Ordinarily, when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the defendant is the prevailing party. (See *Coltrain v. Shewalter*

(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 94, 100, 107 [alleged SLAPP suit dismissed without prejudice].) However, “a court may base its attorney fees decision on a pragmatic definition of the extent to which each party has realized its litigation objectives, whether by judgment, settlement, or otherwise.” (*Santisas v. Goodin* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 622 [contract action].)

The trial court ruled that defendants were the prevailing parties, finding that “they obtained what they wanted out of the litigation—[plaintiff] dismissed his actions and did not get restraining orders or any other relief.” It rejected plaintiff’s claim that he was the prevailing party because he achieved what he sought outside of court through Police Chief Irvine’s assurances that what happened at his home would not be allowed to happen again. The trial court found that plaintiff “did not obtain this alleged promise by Chief Irvine *as a result of these lawsuits*.” It reasoned that plaintiff could have sought Chief Irvine’s commitment without filing the civil harassment petitions. Moreover, the trial court recognized the substantial difference between what plaintiff did achieve outside of the lawsuit, i.e., “a commitment by Chief Irvine to enforce existing law—whatever that is worth,” and the “gravity” of what plaintiff sought through the lawsuit, i.e., “remedies that would have limited [defendants]’ liberty, namely their freedom of movement and communication,” as well as “a court finding that they engaged in socially unacceptable behavior.”

We agree with the trial court. The objective of plaintiff’s civil harassment petitions was to obtain orders restraining defendants from, among other things, harassing or contacting him or his wife, and requiring defendants to stay 100 yards away from him, his wife, his home, and his workplace—i.e.,

Wedgewood. Plaintiff failed to achieve that objective, and obtaining Chief Irvine's assurances fell short of such objective.

Moreover, to the extent obtaining Chief Irvine's commitment to enforce the law can be characterized as having obtained plaintiff's objectives in bringing suit, there is no evidence that plaintiff's civil harassment petitions motivated Chief Irvine to give her assurances or even that Chief Irvine knew of the petitions. In this regard, we reject plaintiff's contention the trial court impermissibly "required" a nexus between plaintiff's filing the petitions and Chief Irvine's actions. The trial court never stated such a nexus was necessary for plaintiff to be a prevailing party. Rather, the trial court's consideration of the lack of any causation between the lawsuit and Chief Irvine's assurance to plaintiff was a valid (if not dispositive) factor in the exercise of its discretion. We likewise reject plaintiff's suggestion that the absence of evidence that his civil harassment petitions were not a motivating factor for the police department means we should infer the petitions were a motivating factor. That suggestion fails to acknowledge that plaintiff bears the burden of showing the trial court's prevailing party determination exceeded the bounds of reason. (*Shaw*, *supra*, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)

For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that defendants were prevailing parties.

C. *Attorney Fees Calculation*

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in calculating defendants' attorney fees award on the civil harassment petitions. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate error.

“A trial court’s exercise of discretion concerning an award of attorney fees will not be reversed unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. [Citation.] “‘The ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong[’]—meaning that it abused its discretion. [Citations.]” [Citation.] Accordingly, there is no question our review must be highly deferential to the views of the trial court. [Citation.]” (*Nichols v. City of Taft* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1239 (*Nichols*)).

In their attorney fees motion, defendants requested \$84,150 in attorney fees and \$370 in court costs.⁵ The trial court awarded a reduced amount—\$40,000—finding defendants’ attorneys’ hourly rates were too high and a large amount of time was spent on unsuccessful settlement negotiations and the anti-SLAPP motion, which would not have succeeded.

Plaintiff contends the trial court disregarded its findings in reducing the requested attorney fees and court costs by \$44,520 because time spent on the anti-SLAPP motion alone accounted for \$43,230 of the initial request. Thus, plaintiff concludes, the trial court essentially reduced the attorney fees award by the amount spent on the anti-SLAPP motion with no reductions for

⁵ In their reply in support of their motion, defendants increased their request for attorney fees to \$100,525, the adjustment reflecting attorney time responding to plaintiff’s opposition. The trial court based its attorney fees award on the \$84,150 figure in defendants’ attorney fees motion and not on the \$100,525 figure in their reply. Defendants do not claim on appeal that the trial court erred.

the attorneys' unreasonably high hourly rates or fruitless settlement negotiations.

Plaintiff does not explain how he arrived at the \$43,230 figure. His opening brief cites his opposition to defendants' attorney fees motion, which in turn does not explain how plaintiff arrived at the unmodified lodestar of \$28,820 ($\$28,820 \times 1.5 = \$43,230$) for work on the anti-SLAPP motion referenced in the opposition. "Counsel is obligated to refer us to the portions of the record supporting his or her contentions on appeal. [Citations.] . . . [W]e will not scour the record on our own in search of supporting evidence. [Citation.] Where, as here, respondents have failed to cite that evidence, they cannot complain when we find their arguments unpersuasive. [Citation.]" (*Sharabianlou v. Karp* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1149.) Plaintiff has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in awarding defendants' attorney fees and court costs. (*Nichols, supra*, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1239.)

II. Defendants' Cross-Appeal

Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying attorney fees related to their anti-SLAPP motions on the ground that defendants would not have prevailed on such motions. Specifically, they argue the trial court erred in finding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to plaintiff's civil harassment petitions because defendants failed to establish the first step in bringing a successful motion—i.e., that defendants engaged in protected activity. Because defendants' challenged activity concerned a purely private issue and did not concern or further

the public discourse on a public issue or an issue of public interest, the trial court did not err.⁶

“A SLAPP suit—a strategic lawsuit against public participation—seeks to chill or punish a party’s exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. [Citation.] The Legislature enacted . . . section 425.16—known as the anti-SLAPP statute—to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights.” (*Rusheen v. Cohen* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055–1056; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1)⁷.) The anti-SLAPP statute is to be construed broadly, but not so broadly as to apply to purely private transactions. (*Garretson v. Post* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1524 (*Garretson*).) We review an order denying an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (*Flatley v. Mauro* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325–326.)

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the

⁶ Accordingly, we do not reach defendants’ second contention that plaintiff would not have prevailed on his civil harassment petitions.

⁷ Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides, “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”

defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (*Baral v. Schnitt* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)

At the first step, “[t]he moving defendant’s burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken ‘in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (*Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) Section 425.16, subdivision (e) sets forth four categories of conduct the anti-SLAPP statute protects.⁸ Defendants argue their demonstrations were conducted “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest” within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4) because they were directed at plaintiff and his company and were “related to the company’s residential real estate

⁸ Section 425.16, subdivision (e) provides, “As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

business practices that displace residents and gentrify working-class neighborhoods.” Further, the demonstrations concerned the root causes of the great recession—large scale fix-and-flip real estate practices.

““The definition of ‘public interest’ within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly construed to include not only governmental matters, but also private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity.” [Citation.]’ (*Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist.* (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1233 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57]; see *Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 205].) ‘[T]he precise boundaries of a public issue have not been defined. Nevertheless, in each case where it was determined that a public issue existed, “the subject statements either concerned a person or entity in the public eye [citations], conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants [citations] or a topic of widespread, public interest [citation].” [Citation.]’ (*Hailstone v. Martinez* (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 736–737 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 347].)” (*USA Waste of California, Inc. v. City of Irwindale* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 53, 65 (*USA Waste of California, Inc.*)).

In *FilmOn.com*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th 133, the Supreme Court granted review in part “to decide if and how the context of a statement—including the identity of the speaker, the audience, and the purpose of the speech—informs a court’s determination of whether the statement was made ‘in furtherance of’ free speech ‘in connection with’ a public issue” and thus merits protection under the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall provision. (*Id.* at

pp. 142–143.) Speech that is “too remotely connected to the public conversation” about “the issues of public interest they implicate” do not “merit protection under the catchall provision.” (*Id.* at p. 140.)

“The inquiry under the catchall provision . . . calls for a two-part analysis rooted in the statute’s purpose and internal logic. First, we ask what ‘public issue or . . . issue of public interest’ the speech in question implicates—a question we answer by looking to the content of the speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Second, we ask what functional relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation about some matter of public interest. It is at the latter stage that context proves useful.” (*FilmOn.com, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.)

Applying the first part of the catchall provision analysis, we conclude that defendants’ demonstrations at Wedgewood’s office building and plaintiff’s residence focused on coercing Wedgewood into selling back the property to Ms. Caamal at a reduced price, which was a private matter concerning a former homeowner and the corporation that purchased her former home and not a public issue or an issue of public interest. (*Garretson, supra*, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524; *USA Waste of California, Inc., supra*, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 65.) The private nature of the demonstrations is made clear in defendants’ own declarations submitted in support of the anti-SLAPP motions.

In Ms. Caamal’s declaration, she described the motivation for the demonstrations at Wedgewood’s office building. As to the first demonstration, she stated that she and her husband “and a group of concerned citizens *seeking to assist us*, went to Wedgewood’s office building in Redondo Beach and requested a meeting with [plaintiff] *to attempt to prevent the impending*

eviction and negotiate a re-purchase of m[y] home.” (Italics added.) As to the second demonstration, she stated that “as Wedgewood was attempting to lock me and my husband from our home and continuing to ignor[e] letters from both myself and my attorney, my husband and I, as well as another group of citizens *supporting our effort to repurchase our home*, returned to Wedgewood’s office and again requested a meeting with [plaintiff].” (Italics added.) She said nothing about Wedgewood’s residential real estate business practices displacing residents and gentrifying working-class neighborhoods or about large scale fix-and-flip real estate practices being a root cause of the great recession.

Consistent with his wife’s stated purpose for the first demonstration, Mr. Caamal stated in his declaration, “I “accompanied my wife to Wedgewood’s office building . . . to obtain an answer as to why Wedgewood was refusing to negotiation [*sic*] with my wife *in her attempt to repurchase our home.*” (Italics added.) Kuhns likewise stated in his declaration, “I and others involved with ACCE accompanied Mr. and Ms. Caamal to Wedgewood’s office building . . . *to obtain an answer as to why Wedgewood was refusing to negotiation [*sic*] with the Camaals [*sic*] in their attempt to repurchase their home.*” (Italics added.) Neither Mr. Caamal nor Kuhns said anything in his respective declaration about the purpose of the demonstrations relating to issues of displacement of residents due to residential real estate business practices, gentrification, or large scale fix-and-flip real estate practices leading to the great recession.

Even a third-party participant, Saucedo, the National Lawyers Guild legal observer, described in his declaration the purpose for the demonstration at plaintiff’s residence as a private

matter limited to the Caamals' dispute with Wedgwood. He stated that ACCE organized the demonstration at plaintiff's residence "to protest unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgwood . . . and its agents *in acquiring the real property of Pablo and Mercedes Caamal, and evicting them from their home.*" (Italics added.) That motivation was purely personal to the Caamals and did not address any societal issues of residential displacement, gentrification, or the root causes of the great recession.

As to the content of the speech, during the first demonstration at Wedgwood, the Caamals requested a meeting at which they could discuss repurchasing their property from Wedgwood and the demonstrators left the building once Puhl agreed to such a meeting. During the second demonstration, the demonstrators sought another meeting and Mr. Caamal stated that Wedgwood would not get him out of the property alive. The only evidence of the specific content of the speeches during the demonstration at plaintiff's residence was that the demonstrators demanded plaintiff personally come out of his home.

Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635 (*Thomas*) is instructive. Defendants argue that *Thomas* supports their claim they engaged in protected activity because the *Thomas* court found that protest activities against a landlord by a tenant and a group of activists were covered by the anti-SLAPP statute in that particular case. But the facts of *Thomas* demonstrate precisely why defendants' activities here were not protected.

In *Thomas, supra*, 126 Cal.App.4th at page 654, defendant Quintero was a tenant in a building owned by plaintiff Thomas. They became "embroiled in a number of landlord-tenant disputes, which culminated in an eviction proceeding." (*Ibid.*) Quintero

was then put in touch with a group called Campaign for Renters Rights (CRR) through which he met many other former tenants of Thomas. (*Ibid.*) Quintero thus learned that Thomas was “a ‘notorious landlord’ whose pattern of unjust evictions throughout Oakland was ‘the first big public case of the campaign in Oakland for a Just Cause of Eviction Ordinance.’” (*Ibid.*) Indeed, CRR previously “had helped to organize 21 former tenant families who were allegedly owed more than \$35,000 in unpaid security deposits by Thomas” and “claim[ed] to have contacted more than 100 former tenants of Thomas’s.” (*Id.* at pp. 654–655.) According to CRR materials, “Thomas had filed evictions against 142 families over a five-year period,” and “he was successfully sued by the City of San Rafael for \$19,000 when he failed to initiate repairs of rental units he owned there.” (*Id.* at p. 655.) After Quintero and a group appeared at Thomas’s church to protest, Thomas petitioned for a civil restraining order, claiming that Quintero and his group “harassed church members, blocked entrances, and trespassed on church property, with the stated purpose of causing extreme embarrassment and severe emotional distress” to him. (*Id.* at p. 654.)

The court in *Thomas, supra*, 126 Cal.App.4th at page 661, held that Quintero’s activities were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, finding that, “while his private interests were certainly in issue, there were much broader community interests at stake in the protests.” Specifically, the court reasoned that the protests involved issues of public interest because Thomas was “accused of wrongfully evicting and improperly retaining the security deposits of more than 100 tenants” and was “accused of a pattern of refusing to make needed repairs to his rental properties, allegedly resulting in legal action being taken against him by

several municipalities.” (*Ibid.*) The court found that such “allegations against Thomas implicate both a concern for the stability of the rental market in the affected community, as well as intimate the threat of potential urban blight associated with the failure to make necessary repairs to buildings in the neighborhood.” (*Ibid.*) Moreover, the court noted that the “protest activities were not an end to themselves, but were coupled with a genuine effort to engage the members of Thomas’s congregation in discussing and finding a solution to the disputes,” namely, “there was a direct call for public involvement in an ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion with respect to Thomas’s past and continued property management practices.” (*Ibid.*)

Here, by contrast, we do not find in the record any basis to conclude plaintiff was a public figure or had gained widespread notoriety throughout the community for his real estate activities. Nor do we find any basis to believe the Caamals’ private dispute with plaintiff was one of many similar disputes shared in common with members of the community.⁹ The record is also

⁹ In their cross-appeal reply brief, defendants state plaintiff’s company “has been accused of unlawful conduct throughout the state” and claim “the record includes accusations” that the company harassed and evicted “many” immigrant working class families, directed its employees to aggressively target foreclosed homes and refrain from repairing them, and participated in various unlawful and fraudulent schemes. To support that claim, however, defendants cite only to two civil complaints filed by two separate homeowners involving two individual properties located in San Francisco. Those complaints are appended as exhibits to a request for judicial notice, which it appears the trial court never granted. Even if properly before this court, these two additional,

devoid of any governmental complaints, actions, or disputes with plaintiff or his company, which might be indicative of a broader public issue with respect to plaintiff's house-flipping conduct. Further, as discussed above in defendants' declarations, the purpose of the demonstrations was to assist the Caamals in getting the property back, not to engage other members of the community or to call for public involvement in finding a solution to purported issues concerning real estate practices. These important differences from the circumstances in *Thomas, supra*, 126 Cal.App.4th 635, underscore exactly why the demonstrations regarding the property were not protected activity concerning a public issue or issue of public interest.

Finally, defendants contend that the "wide-spread" media attention their demonstrations received shows that the demonstrations were matters of public interest. While the fact of media coverage may be indicative of a public matter, "[m]edia coverage cannot by itself . . . create an issue of public interest within the statutory meaning." (*Zhao v. Wong* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1121, disapproved on other grounds in *Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106; see also *Rivero, supra*, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 926 ["If the mere publication of information in a union newsletter distributed to its numerous members were sufficient to make that information a matter of public interest, the public-issue limitation would be substantially eroded, thus seriously undercutting the obvious

isolated instances do not transform the Caamals' private dispute into a public one. (See *Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 925 (*Rivero*) [supervisor's conduct toward eight custodians in the union did not rise to the level of a public issue involving unlawful workplace activity].)

goal of the Legislature that the public-issue requirement have a limiting effect”].) Moreover, the record on the media attention that defendants did enjoy is not entirely clear. In describing media attention, defendants primarily cited to various websites, without attaching the articles themselves or archiving an article so that the trial court could determine what an article stated at a relevant time.¹⁰ In any event, for the reasons discussed above, defendants’ demonstrations concerned the Caamals’ private dispute with plaintiff and his company. The fact that they attracted some media attention did not convert a purely private matter into one of public interest.

As for the second part of the catchall provision analysis, even if we accepted defendants’ contention that the demonstrations concerned the issues of displacement of residents due to residential real estate business practices, gentrification, and large scale fix-and-flip real estate practices leading to the great recession, those demonstrations did not qualify for statutory protection because they did not further the public discourse on those issues. “[I]t is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate.’ (*Wilbanks [v. Wolk* (2004)] 121 Cal.App.4th [883,] 898 [17

¹⁰ The dissent refers to a press release by Wedgewood accusing ACCE of being interested in headlines in support of the notion that this was a matter of public interest. But that press release was made in August 2016, four and a half months after the demonstration at plaintiff’s home and the filing of the requests for civil harassment restraining orders and does not establish that the demonstrations, at the time, were conducted in connection with a public issue.

Cal.Rptr.3d 497]; see also *Dyer v. Childress* (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1280 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 544] [“the fact that ‘a broad and amorphous public interest’ can be connected to a specific dispute’ is not enough].” (*FilmOn.com, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.) In determining whether speech or conduct contributes to the public debate and thus qualifies for statutory protection, “we examine whether a defendant—through public or private speech or conduct—participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest. [Citations.]” (*Ibid.*; *id.* at p. 151.) As we conclude above, defendants’ demonstrations at Wedgewood’s office building and plaintiff’s residence were directed at Wedgewood and plaintiff and were for the purpose of coercing Wedgewood into selling back the property to Ms. Caamal at a reduced price. Accordingly, the demonstrations did not further the public discourse on the issues of displacement of residents due to residential real estate business practices, gentrification, or large scale fix-and-flip real estate practices leading to the great recession.

To be fair, and as the dissent observes, defendants’ conduct does bear certain hallmarks of classic SLAPP conduct. For instance, defendants characterize their conduct as participating in a “demonstration” or “residential picket.” They held signs, sang songs, chanted, and gave short speeches. Further, the National Lawyers Guild is “a bar association whose members frequently engage in legal observing for organizations and individuals exercising their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.” But merely characterizing conduct as a demonstration or picket does not grant that conduct First Amendment protections. (See, e.g., *FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 152 [“[d]efendants cannot merely offer a ‘synecdoche

theory' of public interest, defining their narrow dispute by its slight reference to the broader public issue"].)

The anti-SLAPP statute “defines conduct in furtherance of the rights of petition and free speech on a public issue not only by its content, but also by its location, its audience, and its timing.” (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th. at p. 143.) Here, the record indicates that the demonstrations at Wedgewood’s Office occurred at a commercial building, during office hours, and were directed at plaintiff. As to the demonstration at plaintiff’s residence, it took place at 9:00 p.m. and there is no indication in the record that there was an audience other than plaintiff and his family, and no evidence of media presence to inform persons not at the demonstration. Based on this record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that defendants’ activities were not in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

KIM, J.

I concur:

MOOR, J.

Geiser v. Kuhns et al.
B279738

BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

Before we get to the merits, a brief recitation of the procedural history of this case is in order. This court initially decided this appeal in 2018. The panel majority held the trial court correctly awarded attorney fees to defendants Mercedes Caamal, Pablo Caamal, and Peter Kuhns for prevailing in civil harassment petition litigation, but excluded from the fees calculation work done on anti-SLAPP motions that defendants filed to strike the civil harassment petitions. I dissented from the anti-SLAPP holding, explaining the majority incorrectly concluded no anti-SLAPP protected activity was at issue. Our Supreme Court thereafter granted a petition for review of this court's opinion and held the matter pending the outcome of its decision in *FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc.* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (*FilmOn*), an anti-SLAPP case. Once that decision issued, our Supreme Court issued an order transferring the case back to us for reconsideration in light of *FilmOn*. We vacated our prior opinion and asked counsel to reargue the case.

The largely recycled opinion the majority now files is no more persuasive (as to the cross-appeal's anti-SLAPP issue¹) than the first. The majority's treatment of the *FilmOn* opinion misunderstands the bounds and contours of the anti-SLAPP

¹ I continue to concur in the majority's resolution of the civil harassment attorney fees issue.

statute's "catchall provision" (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 139-140) and produces an outcome inconsistent with the speech-protective purpose behind the anti-SLAPP statute. When *FilmOn* is properly applied, as I will endeavor to show, it is even more apparent now than it was before that the majority's anti-SLAPP rationale is wrong.

I

A sentence that comes early in *FilmOn* suffices almost by itself to point the way to the correct result here. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Cuéllar explained: "In the paradigmatic SLAPP suit, a well-funded developer limits free expression by imposing litigation costs on citizens who protest, write letters, and distribute flyers in opposition to a local project." (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 143.) Now consider the facts here. Well-funded developer? Check. Citizen protest of a local (evict-and-flip housing) project? Check. Limits on free expression by imposing litigation costs? Check. Our facts illustrate precisely why, as I previously said, this case has many of the hallmarks of vintage SLAPP conduct. But let us examine the *FilmOn* decision in greater detail to understand the full analytical route a court should travel to determine anti-SLAPP protected activity is implicated here.

FilmOn.com, a business that distributes online entertainment programming, sued DoubleVerify, a business that generates reports for prospective advertiser clients about the content and viewers of various websites. (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 140-141.) FilmOn.com contended DoubleVerify improperly disparaged FilmOn.com websites in the reports DoubleVerify sent confidentially to its advertiser clients because

the reports characterized some of FilmOn.com’s websites as depicting adult content or copyright infringing material. (*Id.* at 141-142.) In response to FilmOn.com’s lawsuit, DoubleVerify filed an anti-SLAPP motion contending its website reports “‘concerned issues of interest to the public’ because ‘the public ha[s] a demonstrable interest in knowing what content is available on the Internet, especially with respect to adult content and the illegal distribution of copyrighted material.’ [Citation.]” (*Id.* at 142.)

The trial court granted DoubleVerify’s anti-SLAPP motion and the Court of Appeal affirmed. But our Supreme Court “granted review to decide if and how the context of a statement—including the identity of the speaker, the audience, and the purpose of the speech—[should] inform[] a court’s determination” of whether the statement qualifies as protected activity under subdivision (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute. (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 142-143.) Under that “catchall” subdivision, “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest” qualifies as anti-SLAPP protected activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)

In fleshing out the meaning of subdivision (e)(4), our Supreme Court looked for contextual clues in the other categories of activity protected by the statute and concluded conduct in furtherance of the rights of petition and free speech on a public issue is defined not only by the content of the speech or petitioning activity but by “its location, its audience, and its timing.” (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 143.) Specifically, the Court held catchall provision analysis should consider whether

speech or petitioning activity was private or public, to whom it was directed, and for what purpose it was undertaken. (*Id.* at 148.) The *FilmOn* opinion describes a two-step process to allow for such contextual consideration.

First, courts should identify what public issue or issue of public interest is implicated in the case at hand. (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 149.) In performing this task, our Supreme Court cited with approval Court of Appeal decisions that have “distilled the characteristics” of what counts as an issue of public interest. (*Ibid.* [citing *Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913 (*Rivero*) and *Weinberg v. Feisel* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122 (*Weinberg*)].) *Rivero* cites three non-exhaustive categories of public interested matters: a person or entity in the public eye (e.g., the Church of Scientology), conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants (e.g., allegedly defamatory statements made regarding a homeowners association of more than 3,000 individuals), or a topic of widespread, public interest (e.g., the general topic of child molestation in youth sports). (*Rivero, supra*, at 924.) *Weinberg* clarifies a matter of public interest does not equate with mere curiosity and should be something of concern to a substantial number of people. (*Weinberg, supra*, at 1132-1133.)

Second, courts should assess “what functional relationship exists between the speech [or petitioning activity] and the public conversation about some matter of public interest.” (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 149-150.) Context is useful in undertaking this inquiry, our Supreme Court explained, because it helps avoid the quagmire that otherwise results when “courts strive to discern what the challenged speech is really ‘about’—a narrow,

largely private dispute, for example, or the asserted issue of public interest.” (*Id.* at 149; see also *ibid.* [“[I]f the social media era has taught us anything, it is that speech is rarely ‘about’ any single issue”].) As already described, the contextual inquiry considers all relevant circumstances, including the identity of the speaker or petitioner, the audience sought, the timing and location of the speech or petitioning, and the apparent purpose of the conduct assertedly protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (*Id.* at 142-144, 154.) When there is “some degree of closeness” between the challenged statements and the topic of asserted public interest, such that the statements themselves can be said to have contributed to the public debate “in some manner,” the statements are protected under the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall provision. (*Id.* at 150.)

Performing this two-step analysis on the facts presented in *FilmOn*, our Supreme Court held the website reports sent to advertisers did not qualify as anti-SLAPP protected activity. (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 154.) The Court acknowledged the actions of a prominent CEO (DoubleVerify argued FilmOn.com’s CEO was in the public spotlight) or the issue of children’s exposure to sexually explicit media content would qualify as issues of public interest.² (*Id.* at 152.) But the Court held

² In identifying the topics of public interest at issue, the Court seemed to defer at least in part to DoubleVerify’s own identification of those issues. The *FilmOn* Court noted “DoubleVerify has identified the public issues or issues of public interest to which its reports . . . relate” and the Court assumed at least one of the issues DoubleVerify identified (the prominence of FilmOn.com’s CEO) merited analysis. (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 152.)

DoubleVerify’s reports did not further the public conversation on either issue—emphasizing that the website reports were not distributed to the public at all, only sent confidentially to DoubleVerify’s clients who used them solely for their own business purposes. (*Id.* at 153.) The Court cautioned that this single contextual factor (private distribution) was not alone dispositive (*ibid.*), but the Court reasoned the factual “scenario before [it] involve[d] two well-funded for-profit entities engaged in a private dispute over one’s characterization—in a confidential report—of the other’s business practices,” which was not an instance in which a court should liberally extend anti-SLAPP protection to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance. (*Id.* at 154.)

II

When the *FilmOn* framework is applied here, the opposite result obtains: the public protest outside plaintiff Gregory Geiser’s home contributed to public debate in some manner and qualifies as protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).

1

Much like DoubleVerify in *FilmOn*, defendants identify the issue of interest to the public that is implicated in this case: displacement of long-term community residents by unfair foreclosure and fix-and-flip housing practices.³ Fairly read, the

³ As in *FilmOn*, we should give some weight to defendants’ own identification of the issue of interest to the public that is implicated here. There is little concern speakers will devise and rely on post-hoc rationalizations because the analysis of context—

record bears out the assertion that the content of the speech in question concerned Geiser and his company's housing practices that displace long-time community residents.

The protest outside Geiser's home was attended by Kuhns, the Los Angeles Director of Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE); the Caamals; other ACCE members; and Gabriel Saucedo, a representative of the National Lawyer's Guild. ACCE, according to Kuhns, is an entity dedicated to "sav[ing] homes from foreclosures and the fight against displacement of long[-]term residents in our communities." With that mission, ACCE's participation in the protest is enough by itself to infer the content of the public protest outside Geiser's home concerned unfair (at least as perceived by ACCE) housing practices that displace long-time community residents. But there is more.

Saucedo explained in a declaration that the purpose of the ACCE-attended demonstration outside Geiser's home was "to protest unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood, LLC [Geiser's company] . . . and its agents in acquiring the real property of [the Caamals], and evicting them from their home." The reference to "practices" suggests conduct that includes—but extends beyond—the Caamals' own situation. And that is borne out by the relatively large group, 25 to 30 people, participating in the protest at 9:00 p.m. on a Wednesday evening. That group well exceeds the number of people who had some personal stake in, or connection to, the foreclosure on the Caamals' home, which

the degree of closeness between the identified interest and the pertinent circumstances—that occurs at step two of the *FilmOn* inquiry will normally smoke out a fabricated issue of public interest identified at step one.

means the only apparent shared tie among everyone present was the desire to engage in public speech consistent with ACCE's mission and the issue of public interest identified here: combatting unfair housing and foreclosure practices that displace long-term community residents.⁴

There is no real dispute that this issue is indeed one of genuine public interest. (See *Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 [an issue of public interest is *any issue in which the public is interested*].) Indeed, if there were any doubt about that, the fact that Wedgewood issued a press release of its own (one that argued ACCE was more interested in “making headlines” than in helping the Caamals return to their home) confirms Wedgewood's resident-displacing practices was an issue in which the public was interested.

The majority arrives at a different conclusion at step one of the *FilmOn* inquiry by making two missteps. First, the majority

⁴ The Caamals' declarations also generally describe, after recounting their eviction from the home where they lived for 10 years, what occurred during the protest outside Geiser's home. They say the protesters “held signs, sang songs, chanted, and gave short speeches, all from the sidewalk.” The majority faults the declarations for not being more specific, i.e., for not detailing whether the signs, songs, speeches, and chants made reference to Wedgewood's residential real estate business practices displacing residents. I suppose that is logical so far as it goes: the absence of direct protestor quotes in the declarations means the majority is free to believe the ACCE members and others present outside Geiser's home might have been holding signs and chanting about the Protestant Reformation or some topic other than displacement of long-term residents like the Caamals. But that is a strained and artificial way to read the record.

spends an inordinate amount of time parsing the descriptions in the Caamals' declarations of the earlier two sit-ins inside the lobby of Wedgewood's office building rather than the public protest outside Geiser's home. The lobby sit-ins, however, are largely irrelevant. It was the protest on the sidewalk outside Geiser's home from which the civil harassment suits arose, and that protest accordingly should be the focus of our analysis. Second, to the extent the majority does engage with the facts concerning the protest outside Geiser's home, it does so mainly by attacking Saucedo's declaration with italics. Here is the majority's sentence: "He [Saucedo] stated that ACCE organized the demonstration at [Geiser's] residence 'to protest unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood . . . and its agents *in acquiring the real property of Pablo and Mercedes Caamal, and evicting them from their home.*' (Italics added.)" Application of italics, however, is not legal analysis. Emphasizing the latter half of Saucedo's sentence does not somehow wipe away his assertion that unfair and deceptive practices used by Wedgewood were in play. And the majority ignores entirely the housing displacement mission of ACCE as described by Kuhns and the participation of ACCE members among the 25 to 30 people present for the sidewalk protest.

2

As just explained, the issue of public interest implicated in this case, properly understood, is displacement of long-term community residents by unfair foreclosure and fix-and-flip housing practices. We now must assess, at step two of the *FilmOn* inquiry, all of the contextual information we have about the sidewalk protest outside Geiser's home to determine whether

there is “some degree of closeness” between the protest and the identified issue of public interest, such that the protest can be said to have contributed to the public debate “in some manner.” (*FilmOn, supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 150.)

The identity of defendants, the audience they sought, and the timing and location of the speech all show a degree of closeness between the protest and the ongoing public conversation about housing displacement. Let us take the considerations in that order.

Kuhns and other ACCE members participated in the sidewalk protest outside Geiser’s home, and ACCE’s identity and involvement is strong evidence of a connection to an issue of public interest. (*Thomas v. Quintero* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 653-655, 661 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to a civil harassment petition filed by a landlord against a tenant who, with the help of a community renters’ organization, organized protests against the landlord; the renters’ organization’s involvement demonstrated that the tenant’s private interests were certainly in issue but “there were much broader community interests at stake in the protests”] (*Thomas*).

The audience sought here, in meaningful contrast to *FilmOn*, was not limited to a confidential communication to a private business. Rather the audience for the speech at issue was the general public, i.e., those within earshot of the protest and those that might hear about it later, including via press reports. This public aspect of the protest was not mere happenstance; it was integral to its design. Defendants’ hope was that by placing the public spotlight on Wedgewood’s practices, Wedgewood and Geiser would relent (motivated either by their own shame or the consequences of public disapprobation) and agree to allow the

Caamals to buy back the home they had occupied for 10 years rather than flipping it and selling it for more.

As to location and timing, these too evince a contribution to the public debate: public sidewalks are traditional sites for discussion and debate as “one of the few places where a speaker can be confident that he is not simply preaching to the choir” (*McCullen v. Coakley* (2014) 573 U.S. 464, 476), and the protest occurred the very same day of the Caamals’ eviction—when public interest in their plight as a concrete example of the consequences of housing displacement was likely to be at its apex. The various contextual considerations therefore show defendants’ sidewalk protest contributed “in some manner” to the public debate.

How does the majority again conclude otherwise? This is the reason we are given: “As we conclude above, defendants’ demonstrations at Wedgewood’s office building and [Geiser’s] residence were directed at Wedgewood and [Geiser] and were for the purpose of coercing Wedgewood into selling back the property to Ms. Caamal at a reduced price.” That is wrong on multiple levels.

At the most obvious level, the sidewalk protest—which involved ACCE members who volunteered to help the Caamals—cannot be fairly said to have been directed solely at Wedgewood and Geiser with no connection to broader issues of interest to the community; *Thomas* illustrates the point nicely.⁵ But on a deeper level, the majority’s analysis fails even on its own terms. Let’s

⁵ The majority finds *Thomas* “instructive,” but learns the wrong lesson. Even a cursory reading of that opinion reveals it is a case that undermines the majority’s anti-SLAPP holding, not one that supports it.

assume, however improbably, that the protesters' sole aim was to get the Caamals their house back and that ACCE would have accordingly disbanded had they been successful. The question still remains, by what means did the protestors seek to succeed? The answer: by appeal to public sentiment. In other words, even if helping the Caamals were the only objective, the way in which defendants and the other protesters hoped to achieve it was by connecting the Caamals' individual plight to public interest in, and disapproval of, long-time community resident displacement and unfair foreclosure practices.⁶ That is just the sort of connection the *FilmOn* contextual inquiry demands at step two.

Stepping back from the doctrinal framework, the question of anti-SLAPP protected activity *vel non* is really rather straightforward on these facts. Stated simply, the public protest contributed to the public debate.

III

The upshot of the majority's anti-SLAPP holding is that in a small corner of Southern California, the venerable American tradition of peaceful public protest—often the only resort of those with modest means—is left diminished by a well-funded litigation scheme seeking to suppress it. That is what the anti-SLAPP statute was intended to guard against, and it is unfortunate the majority idiosyncratically reads the record to

⁶ The majority reasons “merely characterizing conduct as a demonstration or picket does not grant that conduct First Amendment protections.” This is not a case of mere characterization. What is undisputedly at issue here is a protest on a public sidewalk. If the majority believes that sort of conduct does not merit First Amendment protection, the majority should try to explain why.

deny anti-SLAPP protection in a case where, as even the majority concedes, “defendants’ conduct does bear certain hallmarks of classic [anti-]SLAPP[-protected] conduct.”

I would reverse the trial court’s anti-SLAPP attorney fees ruling and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views I have expressed.

BAKER, Acting P. J.

Proof of Service

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2910, Los Angeles, California 90010.

On May 6, 2020, I served true copies of this Petition for Review on the interested parties in this action as follows:

Clerk of the Court California Supreme Court 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102 Frank Sandelmann Brett A. Stroud Dinsmore & Sandelmann 324 Manhattan Beach Blvd., Ste. 201 Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 Seth Cox Alan Dettelbach Wedgewood 100 Manhattan Beach Blvd., #100 Redondo Beach, CA 90278	Clerk of the Court Court of Appeal Second Appellate District 300 S. Spring St., Fl. 2, N. Tower Los Angeles, CA 90013-1213 <i>Via TrueFiling Electronic Service</i> Clerk to the Hon. Armen Tamzarian Los Angeles Superior Court 111 N Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 <i>Via U.S. Mail</i>
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May 6, 2020 at Los Angeles, California.



Matthew Strugar

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California

Case Name: **Geiser v. Kuhns, et al.**

Case Number: **TEMP-4XJDXE1V**

Lower Court Case Number:

1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.
2. My email address used to e-serve: **matthew@matthewstrugar.com**
3. I served by email a copy of the following document(s) indicated below:

Title(s) of papers e-served:

Filing Type	Document Title
ISI_CASE_INIT_FORM_DT	Case Initiation Form
PETITION FOR REVIEW	Second Petition for Review - Geiser v Kuhns

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This proof of service was automatically created, submitted and signed on my behalf through my agreements with TrueFiling and its contents are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

5/6/2020

Date

/s/Matthew Strugar

Signature

Strugar, Matthew (232951)

Last Name, First Name (PNum)

Law Office of Matthew Strugar

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