California Supreme Court Watch

Jan 23, 2025
Cox v. City of Oakland, S280234.

#23-134 Cox v. City of Oakland, S280234. (A162465; 90 Cal.App.5th 805, mod. 91 Cal.App.5th 850; Alameda County Superior Court; RG20068131.) Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in an action for writ of mandate. This case presents the following issue: Is a pre-1972 conveyance by a single deed of a group of fewer than five contiguous lots that are separately described in the deed by reference to lot numbers on a pre-1893 survey map a “division” of land that “creates” an individual lawful lot for each of the separately described lots in the single deed under the conclusive presumption set forth in Government Code section 66412.6, subdivision (a) of the Subdivision Map Act?

Petition for review granted: 7/12/2023

Case fully briefed: 2/20/2024

Cause argued and submitted: 11/05/2024

Opinion filed: Judgment reversed: 1/23/2025

See the Court of Appeal Opinion.

See the Petition for Review.

See the Oral Argument.

See the California Supreme Court Opinion.  (Cox v. City of Oakland (2025) 17 Cal.5th 362.)

“In reviewing the Court of Appeal’s decision, we consider whether the landowner is correct that the conveyance at issue created three separate parcels for purposes of [Government Code] section 66412(a) — consisting of Lot 18, Lot 17, and a portion of Lot 16 — rather than a single parcel encompassing all three lots. We conclude the Court of Appeal misperceived the meaning of section 66412.6(a) and therefore erred in holding that Lot 18 constitutes a lawful separate parcel. As explained below, the phrase ‘division of land’ in section 66412.6(a) should be interpreted in light of similar language contained in the Act’s general definition of ‘subdivision’ provided in section 66424. Properly understood, when applied to a common law conveyance from a grantor to a grantee, the conveyance of one portion of an original parcel constitutes a division under section 66412.6(a) if the conveyance ‘create[s]’ a new parcel comprised of the conveyed portion of property. However, for purposes of section 66412.6(a), a conveyance does not ‘create[]’ multiple parcels merely by referring separately to lots of the contiguous property being conveyed.

Because Lot 18 was always conveyed together with contiguous land, it has never been separately conveyed. The mere use of multiple lot numbers in the description of property being conveyed does not amount to a ‘division’ of land that ‘create[s]’ parcels for each of the individual lots. (§ 66412.6(a).) Thus, Lot 18 was never itself a parcel ‘created’ as a result of ‘a division of land’ during the time period specified by the statute. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment.”

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans concurred.