Nadia Sarkis is an experienced appellate advocate and innovative problem-solver, who strategizes with clients and trial counsel to lay the groundwork for a successful appeal and develop arguments that shape the law. She has a broad-based appellate practice, which includes the representation of public entities in civil rights, employment, and tort matters; working with businesses on product liability, arbitration, and other matters; and serving as amicus curiae in several cases before the Ninth Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court. Nadia has crafted hundreds of briefs and appeared before both state and federal courts throughout California.
Before joining GMSR, Nadia worked as senior litigation counsel, including at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, representing clients in large-scale antitrust, intellectual property, and coverage litigation matters, and trying multiple jury cases to verdict. She also has prior experience working in-house managing litigation, employment, and privacy matters, which informs her collaborative approach with clients and excellent communication skills.
Nadia started her legal career with two appellate clerkships, for Ferdinand F. Fernandez of the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and Chief Justice Mary Mullarkey of the Colorado Supreme Court. Nadia is also a Certified Information Privacy Professional (“CIPP”) through the International Association of Privacy Professionals.
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna (2021) 142 S.Ct. 4 (per curiam)
Continuing GMSR’s record of success in the United States Supreme Court—prevailing in nine of ten cases before the Court—Tim Coates and Nadia Sarkis convin...
Continuing GMSR’s record of success in the United States Supreme Court—prevailing in nine of ten cases before the Court—Tim Coates and Nadia Sarkis convinced the Court to direct entry of judgment in favor of a Union City police officer based on qualified immunity.
The officer had been summoned by a terrified 911 caller barricaded in a room reporting someone using a chainsaw to break down the door. On arrival the officer encountered an armed, non-compliant suspect. A video showed the officer applied a knee restraint with minimal force to secure the still-armed suspect during handcuffing. The Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred when it found that existing precedent put the officer on notice that placing his knee on an armed defendant’s back for eight seconds in the course of handcuffing could constitute excessive force. The Supreme Court agreed that prior precedent—involving a noise complaint, a suspect armed with nothing more than a ham sandwich, and the violent use of a knee restraint—was too dissimilar to put GMSR’s client on notice that his specific conduct could be deemed unlawful.
Morgan v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1078
Obtained reversal of $15 million punitive damages award based on no substantial evidence of managing agent liability.
Obtained reversal of $15 million punitive damages award based on no substantial evidence of managing agent liability.
B.Q. v. Mesa Union School Dist. (Dec. 2, 2020, No. B303351) 2020 WL 7052293 [nonpublished opinion]
Second appeal relating to student’s discrimination claim against school district.
Second appeal relating to student’s discrimination claim against school district.
On the heels of a Ninth Circuit victory relating to the same events, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a student’s discrimination claim for failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. Deciding an issue of first impression, the Second District held that having sought administrative review under the Education Code does not excuse the need to file a pre-suit Government Code tort claim. The Court also rejected plaintiff’s alternative argument that he substantially complied with the claims statute.
Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College Dist. (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82
Court of Appeal reverses adverse jury verdict for lack of substantial evidence, clarifying plaintiffs’ burden of proof on FEHA interactive process claims.
Court of Appeal reverses adverse jury verdict for lack of substantial evidence, clarifying plaintiffs’ burden of proof on FEHA interactive process claims.
A jury awarded plaintiff, a kitchen worker at a community college, $3.4 million, including $2.775 million in noneconomic damages and over $500,000 in attorneys’ fees, for the failure to accommodate and to engage in the interactive process relating to two physical conditions: carpal tunnel syndrome and a subsequent rotator cuff injury. The Court of Appeal reversed. It agreed with GMSR’s arguments (a) that no substantial evidence supported that any reasonable accommodation could have addressed plaintiff’s totally disabling rotator cuff condition and (b) that such an available accommodation was a required element of an interactive process claim. Because the judgment could not be apportioned between damages for the shoulder and wrist conditions, the judgment as to the college’s failure to accommodate her wrist condition had to be reversed. The court ordered a retrial limited to FEHA liability and damages, if any, for the wrist condition.
B.Q. v. Dekok (9th Cir. 2020) 825 Fed.Appx. 533
Ninth Circuit affirms qualified immunity for teacher sued by student for violation of the Establishment Clause.
Ninth Circuit affirms qualified immunity for teacher sued by student for violation of the Establishment Clause.
Plaintiff, a seventh-grade student, claimed that a teacher’s use of inaccurate and negative translations of Sharia law to teach a unit on religion to students violated the Establishment Clause. The district court dismissed the suit, finding that the teacher was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law would have put the teacher on notice that his actions might violate the Establishment Clause. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with GMSR’s argument that given the murky nature of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, there was nothing obvious about any alleged constitutional violation here and hence the teacher was entitled to qualified immunity.
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