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**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA**

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JANE ROE 21,  
*Plaintiff and Appellant,*

v.

DEFENDANT DOE 1, et al.,  
*Defendants and Respondents.*

**SUPREME COURT  
FILED**

JAN 18 2011

Frederick K. Ohlrich Clerk

San Joaquin County Superior Court Case No. CV033950 Deputy

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After the Decision of the Court of Appeal  
Third Appellate District  
Case No. C062505

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**APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW**

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TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF CALIFORNIA AND  
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA:

Pursuant to Rule 8.500(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court,  
Plaintiff and Appellant Jane Roe 21 (“Plaintiff”) in the appeal captioned  
*Jane Roe 21 v. Defendant Doe 1*, (Case No. C062505), respectfully  
Petitions this Court for Review following the decision filed by the Court of  
Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District (Butz, J.; Cantil-  
Sakauye, J., Raye, J., concurring) filed on December 7, 2010, upholding the  
trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint without  
leave to amend.

Attached as Exhibit “A” is a true and correct copy of the December  
7, 2010, unpublished Opinion.

**I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED**

1. Did the Legislature intend to nullify the judicially-crafted  
equitable delayed discovery rule, as applied against non-perpetrator  
defendants, when it removed a previously codified reference to the delayed  
discovery rule from Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1 when the statute was  
amended in 1994, even though the excised language had become surplusage  
and such defendants were not within the scope of the statute at that time?

2. Did the Court of Appeal err when it deviated from the rule

established by *Bouley v. Long Beach Memorial Medical Center* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 601, 607, and *Armijo v. Miles* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1472, by finding that the 2002 amendment to California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 did not reflect clear legislative intent to apply the delayed discovery rule contained in subdivision (a) of that statute retrospectively despite the Legislature's retention of retroactive language from a previous amendment applying the delayed discovery rule to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1999, even those "actions or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999?"

## II. WHY REVIEW IS NECESSARY

*Jane Roe 21 v. Defendant Doe 1* involves a claim by an adult victim of childhood sexual abuse against the institutions who employed her abuser and could have prevented the abuse. This case requires interpretation of the most recent amendment to California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, the statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's action.<sup>1</sup>

The most recent amendment to the statute, which became effective on January 1, 2003, had two components. First, the amendment extended the delayed discovery provisions of section 340.1, subdivision (a), by

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All further "section" references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise specified.

allowing victims of childhood sexual abuse to commence actions against their abuser's employer after the victim's twenty-sixth birthday, which had provided an outer limit under a prior amendment. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, subd. (b)(2). Second, for victims who were over the age of twenty-six and who had discovered the cause of their injuries prior to the 2002 amendment and therefore could not avail themselves of the delayed discovery rule, the Legislature created a one year filing window open to all victims, no matter when the abuse took place, or when the victim discovered the cause of his or her injuries. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, subd. (c).

Although Plaintiff was over the age of twenty-six when the most recent amendment to section 340.1 became effective, and did not commence her action prior to December 31, 2003, Plaintiff alleges that she had repressed all memory of the abuse and did not discover that she had been molested, or the resultant injuries, until November of 2006. She commenced her action in October of 2007.

The Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether these allegations of delayed discovery caused Plaintiff's action to be timely filed in reliance on the expanded delayed discovery rule of section 340.1, or alternatively under the judicially-developed equitable delayed discovery

rule.

In deciding these issues, the Court of Appeal ruled upon a question of law that this Court has expressed a desire to address by granting review of *Quarry v. Doe 1* (Case No. S171382), *K.J. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton* (Case No. S173042), *D.D. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton* (Case No. S176451), *L.A. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton* (Case No. S176483), and *Doe v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego* (“*RCBSD*”)(Case No. S178748). The principal issues presented by the *Jane Roe 21* appeal are also the decisive issues in *Quarry*, *K.J.*, *D.D.*, *L.A* and *RCBSD*.

The *Jane Roe 21* opinion therefore creates the possibility that Plaintiff’s action could be finally adjudicated by the Court of Appeal for failing to comply with the statute of limitations, only to have this Court’s decision in *Quarry* ultimately show that Plaintiff’s action was, in fact, timely. Absent review, Plaintiff’s understanding of the statute of limitations could be validated in *Quarry*, but only after her action had been dismissed and permanently barred. By granting review of the *Jane Roe 21* Opinion, this Court would avert the possibility of such a miscarriage of justice.

Notwithstanding the similar cases pending before this Court, *RCBSD* creates conflict with two lines of cases that have developed in the courts of

appeal, and therefore presents two strong and independent grounds for review.

First, by finding that the Legislature intended to abolish common law delayed discovery principals when it removed surplus language from the 1994 version of section 340.1, the *Jane Roe 21* Court declined to apply the established rule that when the Legislature intends to alter, abrogate or abolish common law principals it must do so expressly and unequivocally. By doing so, the Court of Appeal departed from a long line of cases, including *Goodman v. Zimmerman* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1676.

*Jane Roe 21* runs contrary to the Legislature's broad intent to provide victims of childhood sexual abuse access to the courts. The Court of Appeal's restrictive reading of section 340.1 excludes a distinct class of victims of childhood sexual abuse while providing a remedy to all others. Molestation victims who were over the age of 26, but had not yet discovered the cause of their injuries when the 2002 amendment to the statute became effective are left with no recourse under the Opinion, while every other victim has the opportunity to hold responsible third parties accountable for their actions.

Second, the Court of Appeal departed from established authority that by preserving retroactive language from the earlier version of the statute

and into the amended version, the Legislature demonstrates its clear intent that the amended version of the statute will also have retrospective effect. As a result, *Jane Roe 21* conflicts with the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in *Bouley v. Long Beach Memorial Medical Center* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 601, 607, and *Armijo v. Miles* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1412-13.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeal's Opinion frustrates the stated intent of the California Legislature by making it much more difficult for victims of sexual abuse to hold wrong-doers responsible for their actions. Review by this Court is therefore necessary not only to ensure uniformity of decision-making in this important area but to achieve the expressed intent of the California Legislature to make it easier for victims of childhood sexual abuse to have their day in Court.

### **III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

Appellant was born on June of 1964. (Slip. Op. at 3.) From approximately 1972 to 1976, Appellant was sexually molested by Father Oliver O'Grady on numerous occasions. (Slip. Op. at 4.) Appellant was not Father O'Grady's first victim, nor would she be the last. Father O'Grady molested dozens of children, was convicted of child molestation, imprisoned and deported to Ireland. (Slip. Op. at 4.)

Defendant knew of Father O'Grady's propensity to molest children before Appellant was abused, but failed to take reasonable actions to protect Appellant, and ultimately reassigned Father O'Grady to new parishes where he continued to have access to children. (Slip. Op. at 4.)

Appellant completely repressed all memory of the molestation throughout the duration of her minority and the entirety of her majority until in or about November of 2006. (Slip. Op. at 4.) Appellant commenced her action less than one year later, on October 31, 2007. (Slip. Op. at 5.)

Defendants demurred to Appellant's Complaint, challenging the timeliness of Appellant's action, and the demurrers were sustained with leave to amend. (Slip. Op. at 5.) On November 21, 2008, Appellant filed a First Amended Complaint. (Slip. Op. at 5.) Defendants again demurred, claiming Appellant's claim was not timely filed. (Slip. Op. at 5.) The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. (Slip. Op. at 5.) Judgment was entered and Appellant filed a timely appeal. (Slip. Op. at 5.)

Oral argument was heard in the California Court of Appeal for the Third District on November 17, 2010. The Court of Appeal issued an unpublished decision affirming the decision of the trial court on December 7, 2010.

No Petition for Rehearing was filed in the Court of Appeal.

#### IV. ARGUMENT

##### A. Review is Necessary to Secure Uniformity of Decision

Supreme Court review of an appellate decision is appropriate “when necessary to secure uniformity of decision or to settle an important question of law.” Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(b)(1). The uncertainty regarding the statute of limitations applicable to childhood sexual abuse claims is amply demonstrated by the decision of the Court of Appeal, which noted:

“This court has weighed in on the issue on three prior occasions. (*K.J. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1388, review granted June 24, 2009, S173042; *D.D. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton* (August 12, 2009, C057260)[nonpub. Opn.], review granted on Nov. 10, 2009, S176451; *L.A. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton* (August 12, 2009, C057895) [nonpub. Opn.], review granted Nov. 10, 2009, S 176483.) Each time we agreed with the result reached by the Second Appellate District, Division Eight, in *Hightower v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 759. *Hightower* held that childhood sexual molestation claims against nonabuser entity defendants were time-barred before January 1, 2003, remain time-barred unless the victims filed suit during the one-year revival window, even if they did not recover the memory of the abuse until after the window period closed. (*Hightower*, at pp. 767-768.) . . . [¶] . . . All three of our decisions - *K.J.*, *D.D.*, and *L.A.* - are being held by the California Supreme Court pending final adjudication in the lead case of *Quarry v. Doe 1* (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1574, review granted June 10, 2009, S171382.

\* \* \* \*

“In *Quarry*, the First Appellate District, Division Four, reached a diametrically opposite result from *Hightower* and the three cases we decided. Review was granted by the California Supreme Court, which then placed a hold on our cases. In another case held for the

Supreme Court's decision in *Quarry*, the same panel that decided *Hightower* reaffirmed its holding, while considering and rejecting several new arguments that counsel have developed since *Hightower* was decided. (*Doe v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1382, review granted Feb. 3, 2010, S178748.)”

(Slip. Op. at 2-3.) As discussed in the Court of Appeal's decision, this Court is presently considering five actions raising the issues presented by Jane Roe 21's appeal.

With respect to the lead case, *Quarry*, the briefing to this Court by the parties has been completed since October of 2009. Amicus Curiae briefs have been filed by numerous interested organizations, and the last of the parties' responses to those amicus briefs was filed in January of 2010. As such, the case is postured for disposition in the near future. The possibility therefore exists that, absent an order granting review, Plaintiff's action could be dismissed as untimely pursuant to the Court of Appeal's Opinion, mere months before *Quarry* is decided in a manner that would render Plaintiff's action timely. The grant and hold procedure could not be more appropriate.

Rule 8.512(d)(2) of the California Rules of Court provides “[O]n or after granting review, the court may order action in the matter deferred until the court disposes of another matter . . .” Such an order is appropriate here since both primary issues raised by this Appeal are also squarely raised by

*Quarry*. Presumably, this Court's decision in *Quarry* will be dispositive of the issues raised by this Appeal. There is also a precedent for a grant and hold order relating to the issues raised in the *Jane Roe 21* Opinion. After Review was granted in *K.J., L.A., D.D.* and *RCBSD*, this Court ordered those matters deferred until the *Quarry* matter is decided.

An order granting review and deferring future action on this case until resolution of the *Quarry* case, is appropriate.

**B. The Equitable Doctrine of Delayed Discovery was Not Abrogated**

“A plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after the accrual of the cause of action . . . [I]n other words, statutes of limitation do not begin to run until a cause of action accrues.” *Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806. A cause of action generally accrues when each element of the cause of action is present. *Norgart v. Upjohn, Co.* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 398. “An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the ‘discovery rule,’ which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” *Fox*, 35 Cal.4th at 807. The discovery rule may be “expressed by the Legislature or implied by the courts.” *Norgart*, 21 Cal.4th at 397.

The *Jane Roe 21* Court determined the judicially developed

discovery rule was inapplicable to childhood sexual abuse actions. The Court reasoned that the 1986 and 1990 versions of section 340.1 proclaimed that the statute did not foreclose reliance on the equitable delayed discovery doctrine, but subsequent amendments have not mentioned the availability of the equitable discovery rule. (Slip. Op. at 11-12.)

It is established, however, that a statute does not alter, abrogate or depart from a common law rule unless the statutory language evidences the Legislature's clear and unequivocal intent to do so. *Goodman v. Zimmerman* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1676. The Legislature did not unequivocally signal such an intent when it removed reference to the equitable discovery doctrine from section 340.1 in 1994. At that time, the terms of the statute provided a longer period of time for recovery than the equitable doctrine would have. As such, reference to the equitable doctrine became surplus. Removal of the language did not signify unequivocal intent to vitiate the common law, and could not have so intended as against non-perpetrator defendants who were not within the reach of the statute at that time. The Court of Appeal therefore departed from a long established rule of construction. Review should be granted to rectify this unwarranted departure from established principles.

**C. The Legislature Expressly Provided for the Delayed Discovery Rule of Section 340.1, Subdivision (a), to Apply Retroactively**

In 1998, the Legislature amended section 340.1, subdivision (a), to extend the statute's reach to non-perpetrator defendants whose negligent or intentionally tortious conduct was a legal cause of the sexual abuse of the plaintiff. Stats. 1998, c. 1032 (AB1651), § 1. In 1999, the Legislature clarified that the changes to subdivision (a) enacted the previous year applied to any case filed on or after January 1, 1999, even those "actions or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999."<sup>2</sup> Stats. 1999, c. 120 (SB674), § 1. This language of retroactivity was retained when the statute was amended in 2002. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, subd. (u).

Notwithstanding this plain declaration of retroactive legislative intent, the *Jane Roe 21* Court found that the Legislature did not intend section 340.1, subdivision (a), to apply retroactively. (Slip. Op. at 13-14.) In doing so, the Court misinterpreted section 340.1, subdivisions (a) and (u); failed to effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting and retaining language of retroactivity, and; created conflict with published

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<sup>2</sup>

All further "subdivision" references are to subdivisions of section 340.1 unless otherwise specified.

authorities finding that retention of retroactive language from one amendment to the next demonstrates “unmistakable” legislative intent that the newly-amended statute apply retrospectively.

**1. The Court of Appeal’s decision conflicts with cases interpreting the legal effect of retroactive language preserved from one amendment to the next**

Claims against third party defendants are authorized by subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3) of § 340.1, which permit a plaintiff to commence an action prior to the age of 26, or within three years of discovering that the molestation caused adulthood injuries, “whichever period expires later.” Subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3) were added to section 340.1 “at the 1998 portion of the 1997-98 Regular Session.”

Subdivision (u) provides that:

The amendments to subdivision (a) of this section, enacted at the 1998 portion of the 1997-98 Regular Session, shall apply to any action filed on or after January 1, 1999, and to any action filed prior to January 1, 1999, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999. Nothing in this subdivision is intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there has been a final adjudication prior to January 1, 1999.

This subdivision was originally enacted in 1999 as subdivision (s). It was re-designated as subdivision (u) and reenacted in 2002. Multiple published authorities hold that when retroactive language is preserved from one amendment to the next, changes made at the time of the subsequent

amendment will have retroactive effect.

In *Bouley v. Long Beach Memorial Medical Center*, the court reasoned:

“Here, the Legislative intent is unmistakable. In subdivision (d), section 377.60 provides that ‘This section applies to any cause of action arising on or after January 1, 1993.’ With that language, the Legislature unambiguously provided that the 2002 amendments must be applied to this lawsuit. . . . [¶] . . . It is true that subdivision (d) was not added to the statute to address the 2002 amendments. Instead, it was added in 1997 as urgency legislation in order to undo the unintended consequences of the 1996 amendments, in which the Legislature had inadvertently deprived certain parents of the right to sue. . . . [¶] . . . That bit of history is not determinative. The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the existing law and may certainly be presumed to know the full text of the laws it is amending. The Legislature was free to remove subdivision (d) from the statute once it served its original purpose, or to amend it to specify that it did not apply to the 2002 amendments. The fact that the Legislature chose not to do so can only lead us to conclude that the Legislature intended that subdivision (d) would apply to the 2002 amendments, making those amendments retroactive.”

(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 601, 607 (internal citations omitted). Thus, by retaining retroactive language from a prior amendment to the statute, the Legislature demonstrated its “unmistakable” retroactive intent.

In *Armijo v. Miles*, the court similarly reasoned that: “Subdivision (d) of section 377.60 which prior to the 2002 amendment provided that the wrongful death statute ‘applies to any cause of action arising on or after January 1, 1993,’ was reenacted without change, thereby reflecting the Legislature’s clear intent that the 2002 amendment have retroactive application.”

(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1412-13.

The Court of Appeal declined follow, or even discuss, *Armijo* and *Bouley*, choosing instead to find that the Legislature's retention of subdivision (u) did not demonstrate retroactive intent. In doing so, the Court of Appeal created irreconcilable conflict between *Jane Roe 21* on one hand, and *Bouley* and *Armijo* on the other.

**2. The retroactive application of the delayed discovery rule of section 340.1, subdivision (a), compliments the one year revival window**

The Court of Appeal posed the question: "why, one must ask, would the Legislature revive time-barred claims against subdivision (b)(2) defendants for a limited one-year period if it has also intended, in the same bill, to impose a delayed discovery rule as to all claims, regardless of whether they were time-barred?" (Slip. Op. at 9.)

The answer to this question is simple: because either change alone would provide for a statutory scheme with gaping holes in its coverage. If the Legislature had only applied the delayed discovery rule retroactively, then any victim who discovered the cause of his or her injuries more than three years prior to the enactment of the amendment would be excluded from seeking any recovery. On the other hand, if the one year window had been the only change enacted, any victim who had not discovered the cause of his or her injuries at the close of that one year would be left without

recourse.


By enacting both provisions, all adult victims of childhood sexual were given the opportunity to pursue justice. The retroactive effect given the delayed discovery provision does not render the one year revival window meaningless as the Court of Appeal suggests. Instead it compliments the one year revival period to fashion a complete remedy.

## V. CONCLUSION

This Court should grant review of *Jane Roe 21 v. Defendant Doe 1* (Case No. C062505.) The Opinion is both inconsistent with established precedent examining legislative intent when retroactive language is preserved from one amendment to the next, and departs from an established rule that common law principles are not abrogated absent an unequivocal showing of legislative intent. Finally, the Opinion presents issues that are already pending in five cases before this Court. For each of these reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant the Petition for Review.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 12, 2011

  
Devin M. Storey  
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This brief is reproduced using a proportional typeface of 13 points in size, consists of 3,581 words, and therefore conforms to the requirements set forth in Rule 8.204(d) of the California Rules of Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: 1/12/11

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Devin M. Storey  
Attorney for Appellant

**EXHIBIT A**

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT  
(San Joaquin)

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JANE ROE 21,  
  
Plaintiff and Appellant,  
  
v.  
  
DEFENDANT DOE 1 et al.,  
  
Defendants and Respondents.

C062505  
  
(Super. Ct. No. CV033950)

This is another in a series of appeals wending their way through the appellate courts, in which adult plaintiffs have sought to hold Catholic Church entities liable for child sexual abuse perpetrated by their clergy decades ago.

These plaintiffs argue that their lawsuits are timely under the "delayed discovery rule" of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1,<sup>1</sup> because they did not recover memory of the abuse and its connection to their psychological injuries until they were well into middle age. They maintain this position despite the fact that their lawsuits were filed well after the one-year "revival

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<sup>1</sup> Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

window" that the Legislature established during the calendar year 2003, to bring lapsed claims against nonabuser defendants who knew or had reason to know their agents or employees were molesting children. (§ 340.1, subd. (b)(2), (3).)

This court has weighed in on the issue on three prior occasions. (*K.J. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1388, review granted June 24, 2009, S173042; *D.D. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton* (Aug. 12, 2009, C057260) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Nov. 10, 2009, S176451; *L.A. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton* (Aug. 12, 2009, C057895) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Nov. 10, 2009, S176483.) Each time we agreed with the result reached by the Second Appellate District, Division Eight, in *Hightower v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 759. *Hightower* held that childhood sexual molestation claims against nonabuser entity defendants that were time-barred before January 1, 2003, remain time-barred unless the victims filed suit during the one-year revival window, even if they did not recover their memory of the abuse until after the window period closed. (*Hightower*, at pp. 767-768.)

All three of our decisions--*K.J.*, *D.D.*, and *L.A.*--are being held by the California Supreme Court pending final adjudication in the lead case of *Quarry v. Doe 1* (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1574, review granted June 10, 2009, S171382.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In *Quarry*, the First Appellate District, Division Four, reached a diametrically opposite result from *Hightower* and the

We shall adhere to the position we took in our three prior decisions and affirm the judgment. Because the ultimate resolution of this issue now lies with the state high court, we will not restate our position at length. We shall merely summarize the main points and briefly respond to some of the major arguments offered by Roe.

### FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because this appeal arises from a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and accept as true all material facts properly pleaded. (*Doe v. City of Los Angeles* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 543.) Read in that light, the first amended complaint discloses the following pertinent allegations.

Plaintiff Jane Roe 21 (hereafter Roe, a fictitious name to protect her privacy) was born in June of 1964. Beginning in fifth grade, Roe attended a Catholic school in Lodi operated by defendants The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton and the Pastor of St. Anne Church (collectively the Church).<sup>3</sup> The Church

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three cases we decided. Review was granted by the California Supreme Court, which then placed a hold on our cases. In another case held for the Supreme Court's decision in *Quarry*, the same panel that decided *Hightower* reaffirmed its holding, while considering and rejecting several new arguments that counsel have developed since *Hightower* was decided. (*Doe v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1382, review granted Feb. 3, 2010, S178748.)

<sup>3</sup> The Church entities were not named in the complaint, but were later substituted as Doe defendants.

employed Father O'Grady, who was a "priest, counselor and spiritual leader" at the parish where Roe attended services and was a student.<sup>4</sup>

Beginning in 1972 and continuing until 1976, Roe was sexually molested on multiple occasions by Father O'Grady, usually in an office, a quiet classroom, or in the confessional. The abuse consisted of inappropriate hugging, kissing and sexual touchings. Father O'Grady molested dozens of other children during his tenure as a priest. He was eventually convicted of child molestation, sent to prison and deported to Ireland. The Church knew of Father O'Grady's propensities for sexual abuse of minors prior to the time Roe was molested, yet failed to protect her from his horrendous conduct. Despite its knowledge of his nefarious history as a serial child molester, the Church assigned Father O'Grady to parishes where he continually had access to children. It also continually encouraged and induced Roe to have contact with O'Grady in an unsupervised environment.

During the time she was molested, Roe developed "various psychological coping mechanisms" which made her "incapable of ascertaining the wrongfulness of [Father] O'Grady's sexual conduct toward her." As a result, Roe "completely repressed all memory of the sexual abuse" at the time of the molestations.

In November 2006, Roe was reading a magazine article describing Father O'Grady's sexual misconduct with other minor

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<sup>4</sup> Father O'Grady is not a party to this action.

children. This brought up "painful and disturbing memories of her own sexual molestation at the hands of [Father] O'Grady." As a result, Roe recovered her memory of the abuse, which had been previously repressed.

Father O'Grady's tortious conduct, of which the Church was aware, caused Roe to suffer shock, emotional distress, embarrassment and loss of self-esteem, all of which caused her economic and psychological damage.

Based on these allegations, Roe pleaded many causes of action, including negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure to warn. The final count accuses the Church of making a child available to another for sexual misconduct, in violation of Penal Code section 266j.

#### **PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

Roe filed suit on October 31, 2007. The Church filed a demurrer, including failure to state a cause of action and the statute of limitations bars set forth in sections 340 and 340.1. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.

Roe then filed an amended complaint on November 21, 2008, based upon the same essential allegations. The trial court sustained the demurrer, this time without leave to amend.

Judgment was entered and Roe appeals.

## DISCUSSION

### I. The Delayed Discovery Rule Does Not Apply to Roe

Plaintiff Roe, who is now in her forties, is attempting to state a tort claim against the Church based upon sexual abuse perpetrated against her by one of its priests in the 1970's, when she was between eight and 12 years of age. She alleges that the Church knew of the priest's past history and reputation as a serial child molester yet failed to protect children such as Roe from his predatory behavior. Roe alleges she repressed all memory of the abuse until 2006. She filed this action in 2007, more than 30 years after the childhood sexual abuse had ended. Still, she claims she may take advantage of the "three years [from] the date of discovery" rule set forth in section 340.1, subdivision (a).

"Section 340.1 sets forth a special statute of limitations for victims of childhood sexual abuse." (*County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1268.) It therefore prevails over more general statutory limitations periods that may apply. (*Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.* (1953) 41 Cal.2d 785, 787.)

Roe's complaint invokes the statute of limitations applicable to nonperpetrator defendants who knew or should have known that their agent or employee was sexually abusing children, yet failed to protect victims such as plaintiff. These defendants are specifically identified in section 340.1 subdivision (b)(2), i.e., persons or entities who had "reason to

know" or were "on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct . . . ." (§ 340.1, subd. (b)(2), added by Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1; see *Doe v. City of Los Angeles, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at p. 545.) We will refer to these defendants as subdivision (b)(2) defendants or nonperpetrator defendants.

As a general rule, a cause of action for childhood sexual abuse accrues at the time of molestation. (*John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist.* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 443-446; *Doe v. Bakersfield City School Dist.* (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 556, 567, fn. 2.) Prior to the enactment of section 340.1 in 1986, courts applied former section 340, which provided for a one-year statute of limitations for child sexual abuse claims. Courts also applied section 352, which tolled the running of the statute while the plaintiff was a minor, such that the action could be timely brought on or before the plaintiff's 19th birthday. (See former § 340, subd. (3); *DeRose v. Carswell* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1015.)

Since the last molestation of Roe took place in 1976 when she was still a minor, she had until her 19th birthday to file suit. She did not. Thus, the statute of limitations expired on Roe's claim against the Church in June 1983 when she turned 19.

In 1986, the Legislature enacted section 340.1, which broadened the statute of limitations on claims for childhood

sexual abuse. (Former § 340.1, added by Stats. 1986, ch. 914, § 1, pp. 3165-3166; see *Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 207 (*Shirk*).) The statute was amended on subsequent occasions--each time opening the temporal door a little wider for victims of childhood sexual abuse to bring suit, but only against perpetrators. (*Shirk*, at pp. 207-208.)

In 1998, the Legislature, for the first time, enacted an extended limitations period for bringing tort claims against nonperpetrators of sexual abuse who were nevertheless a "legal cause" of the abuse. However, the amendment carried a firm time cap, requiring suit to be brought no later than the victim's 26th birthday. (§ 340.1, former subd. (b)(1), amended by Stats. 1998, ch. 1032, § 1; *Shirk, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at p. 208.) Because Roe was in her thirties when the law became operative, it had no effect on her lapsed claim.<sup>5</sup> (*Hightower, supra*, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 765-766.)

The 2002 amendment, which is the focal point of this case, changed the law again. The amendment retained the age 26 cutoff for actions against all nonabuser defendants (§ 340.1, subds. (a), (b)(1)) except a limited class of nonperpetrators described in subdivision (b)(2)--those who knew or should have known of the abuse, yet failed to protect the victim. As to these

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<sup>5</sup> In this opinion, we use the term "lapsed" to "describe a cause of action against which the limitations period has run, but which no court has adjudicated." (*David A. v. Superior Court* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 281, 284, fn. 4 (*David A.*).

defendants, the Legislature created two time caps: (1) a new limitations period of age 26 or three years from the date of discovery of adult-onset emotional harm, *whichever is later* (delayed discovery rule); and (2) for victims whose claims were otherwise time-barred on January 1, 2003, the statute of limitations was "revived," provided suit was commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. (§ 340.1, subd. (c).)

Roe argues the delayed discovery rule applies to *any* victim of a subdivision (b)(2) defendant who discovers that his or her psychological injuries were caused by childhood sexual abuse, regardless of whether his or her molestation claims had previously lapsed. However, as the court stated in *Hightower*, such a construction would obliterate the "clear distinction" that the Legislature drew between plaintiffs whose claims were time-barred and those whose were not. (*Hightower, supra*, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 767-768.) It would also render the one-year revival provision meaningless. Why, one must ask, would the Legislature expressly revive time-barred claims against subdivision (b)(2) defendants for a limited one-year period if it had *also* intended, in the same bill, to impose a delayed discovery rule as to *all* claims, regardless of whether they were time-barred? The only interpretation of the 2002 amendment that makes logical sense is that the Legislature intended the delayed discovery rule against nonperpetrator defendants to operate prospectively as to those whose claims were not yet time-barred,

while allowing victims whose claims were time-barred a limited one-year window within which to bring suit.

Our interpretation is consistent with the settled rules of statutory construction. In general, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless (1) they contain express language of retroactivity, or (2) other sources provide a clear and unavoidable implication that the Legislature intended retroactive application. (§ 3; *McClung v. Employment Development Dept.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 475; *Evangelatos v. Superior Court* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1209.) Furthermore, "a legislative change in the statute of limitations is presumed not to revive lapsed claims unless the amending act expressly mandates such an effect. (*Gallo v. Superior Court* [(1988)] 200 Cal.App.3d [1375,] 1378; *Barry v. Barry* (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 107, 112.) If the Legislature wishes to revive lapsed claims, it should so declare in 'unmistakable terms.' (See *Douglas Aircraft Co. [v. Cranston]* (1962) 58 Cal.2d [462,] 466.) Otherwise such claims will be left to lie in repose." (*David A., supra*, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 286.)

We need not respond to each of Roe's arguments to the contrary. Suffice it to say that the 2002 amendment of section 340.1 contains no express language of retroactivity except that provision which opens up a revival window for a limited one-year period and Roe does not point to anything in the legislative history of the statute that shows unmistakably, and without resort to speculative inferences, that the Legislature intended

the delayed discovery rule to operate retroactively to revive all claims against subdivision (b) (2) defendants, regardless of whether they were time-barred when the amendment took effect.

For all of these reasons, we adhere to the position we have taken previously that the delayed discovery rule does not apply to claims such as Roe's that were time-barred when the 2002 enactment came into effect. Because she failed to avail herself of the one-year revival window in 2003, Roe's claim remained time-barred.

## II. Other Arguments

For the sake of completeness, we address Roe's arguments that do not depend either on an unreasonably strained interpretation of the language of the 2002 amendment<sup>6</sup> or on its murky and inconclusive legislative history.

### A. Equitable Delayed Discovery

Roe contends that, regardless of the discovery rule set forth in section 340.1, her action is timely under common law equitable delayed discovery principles. (See *Norgart v. Upjohn Co.* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397-398.) In earlier times, subdivision (d) of the 1986 version of section 340.1 and

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<sup>6</sup> For the first time in his reply brief and at oral argument, counsel for Roe claimed that the phrase "as of" in the first sentence of subdivision (c) must be construed to mean "on or after." Owing to considerations of fairness, we decline to consider an argument raised so belatedly. (*Reichardt v. Hoffman* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.) We do pause to note, however, that the Legislature had no trouble using the phrase "on or after" on several occasions in the same statute, thereby showing that it knew exactly how to use those words when it so intended.

subdivision (1) of the 1990 version expressly permitted judicial application of delayed discovery exceptions to the running of the limitations period.<sup>7</sup> However, that provision was stripped out of section 340.1 as part of the 1994 amendment. (See Historical and Statutory Notes, 13C West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2006 ed.) foll. § 340.1, pp. 172-173.) The deletion has been preserved in all subsequent amendments to the statute. "It is ordinarily to be presumed that the Legislature by deleting an express provision of a statute intended a substantial change in the law.'" (*People v. Dillon* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 467 [disapproved on a separate ground in *People v. Chun* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1186], quoting *People v. Valentine* (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 142.) By removing its previous sanction of equitable theories of delayed discovery, we must presume the Legislature intended to supplant common law delayed discovery with the *statutorily defined* discovery rule that it put in place in 1994. (*City of Irvine v. Southern California Assn. of Governments* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 506, 522.) Thus, the only "delayed discovery" rule that can be recognized is the one the Legislature provided for in section 340.1.

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<sup>7</sup> The provision stated: "*Nothing in this bill is intended to preclude the courts from applying delayed discovery exceptions to the accrual of a cause of action for sexual molestation of a minor.*" (*Evans v. Eckelman* (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1609, 1614, quoting former § 340.1, subd. (d), italics added.)

***B. Subdivision (u)***

Roe also places great emphasis on the fact that in the 2002 amendment, the Legislature retained section 340.1, former subdivision (s) as subdivision (u). Subdivision (u) (originally enacted as subdivision (s) in 1999) states, in relevant part: "The amendments to subdivision (a) of this section, enacted at the 1998 portion of the 1997-98 Regular Session, shall apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1999, and to any action filed prior to January 1, 1999, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999." (Italics added.) Roe argues that by preserving subdivision (u) in 2002, the Legislature signaled an intent to apply the delayed discovery rule retroactively to all claims against nonperpetrator defendants.

This theory ignores the fact that the language of the subdivision refers *only* to the amendments to subdivision (a) enacted in the 1997-1998 Regular Session. That legislation *capped the limitations period at age 26* as to nonperpetrators whose acts were a "legal cause" of the abuse. Subdivision (u) says nothing about the new class of nonperpetrator defendants that was created by the 2002 amendment.

When, for the first time, it lifted the age 26 cap and introduced a delayed discovery rule as to a new class of nonperpetrator defendants defined in subdivision (b), the Legislature could easily have made the rule applicable to claims that would "otherwise have been barred" by preexisting laws.

Instead, it revived time-barred claims for only a limited one-year period. Subdivision (u) does not aid Roe's cause.

### *C. Vicarious Liability*

Roe's next creative argument posits the theory that the Church is liable for Father O'Grady's misconduct through the doctrine of vicarious liability, triggering the statute of limitations applicable to the perpetrator himself rather than his employer, i.e., the Church.

The contention fails. There is nothing in the allegations of the complaint that would warrant the inference that sexually abusing young children either fell within the course and scope of Father O'Grady's priestly duties, or could reasonably be foreseen as an "outgrowth" of such duties. Consequently, the doctrine of respondent superior does not apply. (*Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop* (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1453, 1461.)

The argument also ignores the bedrock principle that specific statutes of limitations prevail over more general ones that might otherwise apply. (*Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.*, *supra*, 41 Cal.2d at p. 787.) Here the Legislature has created a specific statute of limitations for institutions such as the Church who knew of its agent's or employee's propensity for sexual misconduct against minors but failed to protect a child victim. This special statute of limitations necessarily takes precedence over more general ones, such as those based on vicarious liability.

*D. Penal Code section 266j*

Roe's final argument is that the Church may be found liable as a perpetrator rather than a nonperpetrator entity having control over the perpetrator because she has sufficiently alleged that the Church committed the crime of child procurement under Penal Code section 266j. Roe reasons that since Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1's definition of "childhood sexual abuse" includes a violation of Penal Code section 266j,<sup>8</sup> a person who violates that code section must be considered a perpetrator. Accordingly, the applicable limitations for her claim is the one for causes of action against perpetrators of sexual abuse, i.e., three years from the date of discovery or age 26, whichever is later. (§ 340.1, subd. (a)(1).) The argument does not fly.

Penal Code section 266j provides in relevant part: "Any person who intentionally gives, transports, provides, or makes available, or who offers to give, transport, provide, or make available to another person, a child under the age of 16 for the purpose of any lewd or lascivious act as defined in [Penal Code] Section 288, or who causes, induces, or persuades a child under the age of 16 to engage in such an act with another person, is guilty of a felony . . . ."

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<sup>8</sup> Section 340.1, subdivision (e) states: "'Childhood sexual abuse' as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code . . . ."

A person cannot be convicted of child procurement without proof of a sexual purpose. (*People v. Bautista* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1437.) A violation of Penal Code section 266j requires that the procurement of the child be "*for the purpose* of any lewd or lascivious act as defined in [Penal Code] Section 288 . . . ." (Italics added.) While the complaint charges that the Church made Roe "available" to Father O'Grady, under no reasonable construction does it charge that it *intentionally* made her available for a *sexual purpose*. On the contrary, the allegations, construed as a whole and in a common sense manner, plead that the Church knew of Father O'Grady's propensity for child molestation, but turned a blind eye to it. While such conduct may evince negligence or even recklessness, it is plainly not an intentional act of child procurement. Under no stretch of the imagination can the complaint be read to allege that the Church provided child victims to one of its priests with the specific intent that he commit acts of molestation upon them. Penal Code section 266j has no application here.

**DISPOSITION**

The judgment is affirmed.

\_\_\_\_\_  
BUTZ, J.

We concur:

\_\_\_\_\_  
RAYE, Acting P. J.

\_\_\_\_\_  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

I, Lisa E. Maynes, am employed in the city and county of San Diego, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the action; my business address is 12555 High Bluff Drive, Suite 260, San Diego, CA 92130.

On January 14, 2011, I caused to be served: **PETITION FOR REVIEW**

in this action by placing a true and correct copy of said document(s) in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: 1-14-11

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Lisa E. Maynes

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